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INTRODUCTION

Interest income-this subject may seem juiceless, but business persons know how vital a question it is. If interest is not paid to a lending
institution, the loan has become an unproductive asset. Today's monumental savings and loan crisis is nothing but a failure of interest income.
Any entrepreneur knows that failure to generate enough income to cover
debt service means, at the very least, workout negotiations and a consequent loss of freedom to maneuver. At worst, it could mean failure of the
business enterprise and the destruction of jobs, lives, and families.
The Supreme Court has understood the importance of interest income and has recently given us two major pronouncements on the subject
in the context of bankruptcy.
A.

Timbers of Inwood Forest

In the first of these opinions, United Savings Association of Texas v.
Timbers of Inwood Forest, Ltd.,1 Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous
court, ruled that an undersecured creditor-I could not have interest income
after a bankruptcy petition.• Undersecured creditors thought that they deserved interest income as part of their right to adequate protection of the
value of their collateral,• and a great many lower court opinions agreed. 1
' 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
• For example, a $100,000 claim, secured by a lien on collateral with a value of $80,000, is an
undersccured claim. According to Bankruptcy Code § 506(a), quoted infra in text accompanying note
9, the creditor has a secured claim of $80,000 and an unsecured claim of $20,000, while the full claim
is $100,000. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ,i 506.04, at 506-15 (15th ed. 1989).
• 484 U.S. at 372-73.
• Id. at 368-69; see 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (1988) (conditioning use of collateral on adequate protection of secured creditor rights}.
,
• See, e.g., Grundy Nat'! Bank v. Tandem Mining Corp. (In re Tandem Mining Corp.), 754
F.2d 1436, 1440-41 (4th Cir. 1985); Crocker ,Nat'! Bank v. American Mariner Indus., Inc. (In re
American Mariner Indus., Inc.), 734 F.2d 426, 432-35 (9th Cir. 1984). But see Bankers Life Ins. Co.
v. Alyucan Interstate Corp. (In re Alyucan Interstate Corp.), 12 Bankr. 803 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981).
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Justice Scalia, however, pointed out that oversecured creditors• have an
express statutory right to postpctition interest in Bankruptcy Code7 Section 506(b), which provides:
To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property the
value of which, after any recovery under subsection (c) of this section,• is
greater than the amount of such claim, there shall be allowed to the holder
of such claim, interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or
charges provided for under the agreement under which such claim arose.•

Justice Scalia reasoned that if oversecured creditors had an express right
to postpctition interest, then, by implication, undersecured creditors had
none. 10
In the course of so ruling, Scalia endorsed the view that the equity
cushion constitutes the strict limit placed on an oversecured party to collect postpctition interest. 11 This status of the cushion as a limit to postpctition interest is founded on Section 506(b)'s phrase "to the extent." That
is, to the extent there is an equity cushion, the oversecured party can have
postpetition interest. For any amount beyond that, the oversecured party
becomes an undersecured party and can have nothing.
The equity cushion's status as a limit to postpetition interest implies
that if a bankruptcy proceeding lasts long enough, all oversecured parties
• For example, a $100,000 claim, secured by a lien on collateral with a value of $120,000, is an
oversccured claim. The value of the collateral more than covers the amount of the claim. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ,r 506.05, at 506-39 - 506-40 (15th ed. 1989). On these numbers, the bankruptcy estate owns equity of $20,000 in the collateral.
• Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§
101-1330), as amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified as amended •in various sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.); Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99554, 100 Stat. 3114 (codified as amended in various sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.); and,
Retiree Benefits Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-334, 102 Stat. 610 (codified as
amended in various sections of 11 U.S.C.) [hereinafter "Bankruptcy Code" or "Code"].
• Subsection (c) allows the trustee in bankruptcy to charge expenses of preserving or disposing of
collateral to the secured party, to the extent that the secured party benefited by this. 11 U.S.C. §
506(c) (1988).
• 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1988).
10 484 U.S. at 373-74. This was one of many rationales for the decision that undersccured creditors could have no postpetition interest. I have reviewed these other reasons (not always favorably) in
Carlson, Postpetition Interest Under the Bankruptcy Code, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 601-12 (1989)
[hereinafter Carlson].
11 United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 372
(1988) ("this provision permits postpetition interest to be paid only out of the 'security cushion.'").
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will eventually be undersecured parties. 11 Timbers of Inwood Forest, then,
constitutes a major pronouncement on the rights of oversecured creditors.
Its establishment of the equity cushion as the limit of Section 506(b)
rights, however, creates an unacknowledged contradiction for bankruptcy
courts. The contradiction is this-a common method for satisfying the estate's postpetition interest obligation to an oversecured creditor is to pay
the secured creditor from time to time. 11 If those payments are made to an
oversecured creditor, then the equity cushion is enlarged or preserved. Yet
this cushion is also the outward limit of postpetition entitlements. These
postpetition payments threaten to violate Timbers of Inwood Forest if they
result in the oversecured creditor receiving more interest income than the
total, original equity cushion. This article will first address the contradiction between Section 506(b) (as read by the Supreme Court in Timbers of
Inwood Forest) and cash payments of interest (or adequate protection
payments under Section 361(1)).
This article will then explore a way that courts could reconcile this
seeming contradiction. Specifically, during the pendency of the bankruptcy
proceeding, courts should avoid paying oversecured creditors anything. In. stead, if cash outflow to secured creditors is called for, trustees should buy
part of the secured claim, not pay it. As a result, trustees will be able to
exhaust the equity cushion with a combined aggregate of security interests
belonging to the secured creditor and the bankrupt estate. This combined
accrual of security interests will help ensure that the trustees and courts
are following Justice Scalia's suggestion that the equity cushion constitutes the limit of postpetition interest that oversecured creditors can
receive.
11

Ste In re Lapiana, 909 F.2d 221, 223 (7th Cir. 1990).

Section 506(b) provides for only the allowance of postpetition interest for the oversecured
creditor and does not require the payment of the interest. The power of the bankruptcy trustee to
"pay" the interest currently arises from another source, such as adequate protection according to §
361. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ,r 506.5, at 506-43 (15th ed. 1989). Section 361 provides in
pertinent part:
When adequate protection is required .. . of an interest of an entity in property, such
adequate protection may be provided by(1) requiring the trustee to make a cash payment or periodic cash payments to such
entity, to the extent that the stay, . . . use, sale or lease . . . or any grant of a lien . .
. results in a decrease in the value of such entity's interest in such property;
11

(3) granting such other relief ... as will result in the realization by such entity of
the indubitable equivalent of such entity's interest in such prope~y.
11 u.s.c. § 361 (1988).
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Ron Pair

The second Supreme Court opinion concerning oversecured creditors
is United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc. u In Ron Pair, the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) was oversecured by virtue of its tax lien 111 and
requested interest income under Section 506(b).18 Now recall that Section
506(b) holds that "to the extent" there is an equity cushion, "there shall
be allowed to the holder of such claim, interest on such claim, and any
reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided for under the agreement under
which such claim arose." 17 Emphasizing the italicized words, the debtorin-possession asserted that the right to postpetition interest must be provided by a contract; otherwise, no such right existed. 18
The Supreme Court, however, took the position that Section 506(b)
required that only "fees, costs, or charges" must be memorialized in · a
contract. 19 Interest, it reasoned, was unconnected to the contract, being
separated from it by virtue of an all-important comma after the word
"claim."10 According to the Court, the right to postpetition interest is noncontractual, while the right to "fees, costs, or charges" is grounded· in
contract.
Justice Blackmun explained the effect of this important comma:
The phrase "interest on such claim" is set aside by commas, and separated •
from the reference to fees, costs, and charges by the conjunctive words "and
any." As a result, the phrase "interest on such claim" stands independent o(
the language that follows. "Interest on such claim" is not part of the list
made up of "fees, costs, or charges," nor is it joined to the following clause
so that the final "provided for under the agreement" modifies it as well.
The language and punctuation Congress used cannot be read in any other
way.11

In other words, the right to interest is unconnected to the contract. From
this it follows that some noncontractual interest rate should be used, even
if there is a contract rate. ss That is, the proper rate of interest is open to
" 489 U.S. 235, 109 S. Ct. 1025 (1989).
11 Ron Pair, 109 S. Ct. at 1028.
11 Id.
17 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
11 Ron Pair, 109 S. Ct. at 1031-32.
" Id. at 1028-29.
•• Id.
11 Id. at 1031-32.
11 See Warehouse Home Furnishings Distrib., Inc. v. Gladdin (In re Gladdin), 107 Bankr. 803,
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choice, even if the creditor and debtor are parties to a loan agreement. 13
Ron Pair, then, establishes the non~ontractual nature of postpetition
interest. To this must be contrasted the purely contractual nature of "fees,
costs, and charges." Some of these charges might include attorneys' fees
for pursuing self-interested positions of secured creditors-all at the expense of the bankrupt estate. Others include prepayment premiums, default penalties, higher default penalties, and interest on interest. This article will explore the extent to which general creditors have to pay for such
extravagances.
Here is how this article will proceed. First, as mentioned, the article
will review the ways in which adequate protection payments to oversecured creditors can violate the premise of Timbers of Inwood Forest,
which establishes the equity cushion as the outward limit of postpetition
interest entitlements. This review will include a discussion of the extent to
which a trustee can block postpetition interest entitlements by strategically
removing the equity cushion before (or perhaps even after) postpetition
interest has accrued.
Second, the article will examine the choice of an interest rate, now
that Ron Pair has dethroned the contract rate as the necessary, required
rate. Next, the article will analyze the extent to which a secured creditor
can use the equity cushion to pay for various hostile activities, such as
moving to lift the automatic stay or maximizing the secured creditor's po805-06 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1989) ("The plain language of section 506(b) docs not require that interest
be paid at the contract rate. It simply requires that interest be paid." Nevertheless, the court imposed
the contract rate as a matter of prudence.).
Before Ron Pair, many courts assumed that the contract rate was mandatory under § 506(b).
That is, they assumed that the oversecured party must receive the interest "provided for under the
agreement." See, e.g.• United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd. (In re
Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd.), 793 F.2d 1380, 1407 (5th Cir. 1986), ajfd en bane, 808
F.2d 363 (1987), ajfd, 484 U.S. 365 (1988); Schlag v. Mendelson (In re Schlag), 60 Bankr. 749, 751
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986).
11 See In re Laymon, 117 Bankr. 856, 858-59 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990). Contra Warehouse
Home Furnishings Distribs., Inc. v. Gladdin (In re Gladdin), 107 Bankr. 803 (Bankr. M .D. Ga.
1989) (arguing that neither § 506(b) nor Ron Pair authorizes the overthrow of the contract rate). For
a post-Pair argument to the contrary, sec Cohen, Marwil & Gerard, Entitlements of Secured Creditors to Default Interest Rates Under Banlcruptcy Code Sections 506(b) and 1124, 45 Bus. LAW. 415
(1989). These commentators opine that Ron Pair established only the following:
The separation of the two operative phrases by the comma was necessary only to indicate
that oversccurcd claim holders would be entitled to interest even in the absence of an agreement between the parties, particularly in tort and other non-contractual lien claims.
Id. at 417. The authors further assert that the Supreme Court has left "for another time the issue of
allowability of [contractual) default interest rates," but they add that "[t]he analysis in Ron Pair . . .
chills any argument that oversccurcd creditors arc entitled to contract default rates of interest, as a
matter of right under the literal terms of the statute." Id. at 424 n.38.
·
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sition in bankruptcy. The use of the equity cushion for prepayment premiums, default penalties, and higher postdefault interest rates will also be
analyzed. The final part will discuss whether the rule against interest on
interest, set forth in Vanston Bondholders Protective Committee v.
Green, 14 still remains good law in light of Ron Pair and will conclude
that it does, although the premises of Vanston, then as now, can be
questioned.

II.

THE EQUITY CUSHION AS THE LIMIT OF PosTPETITION
INTEREST

As stated earlier, treating the equity cushion as the limit of postpetition interest contradicts the notion of payment as a . means of adequate
protection for depreciating collateral. The following schematic drawing
will be useful in describing the contradiction. 211
E= $1,000
D=$990

A= $1,000

· B=$900

Cl Accrued Interest
e!Debtor Equity

• Principal

Figure One

ADEQUATELY LARGE EQUITY CUSHION AND ACCRUING INTEREST
"' 329 U.S. 156, 165 (1946).
11 This illustration is based upon some preliminary work done in Carlson, supra note 10, at
636-50.
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In Figure One, the left ordinate represents the face amount of dollars
today. The right ordinate represents the face amount of dollars at the time
the bankruptcy proceeding is expected to be concluded. The abscissa represents time. Assume for the moment that the oversecured party is not
paid cash. Instead, interest is allowed to accrue against the shrinking
debtor's equity. Assume also that compound interest is not allowed in
bankruptcy. 18
In such a case, an oversecured party will never become undersecured.
In Figure One, collateral value stays constant at St ,000. That is, collateral value travels in a horizontal line from point A to point E. As interest
· accrues at the rate of 10 percent per year, the amount of the secured claim
increases from $900 at the beginning of the bankruptcy proceeding27 to
$990 at the time the proceeding ends. 18 This is shown by the upward
sloping line BD. As a result, debtor equity shrinks from $100 at the beginning of bankruptcy (line AB) to S10 at the end of the proceeding (line
DE).

A. How Adequate Protection Payments Might Exceed the Equity
Cushion
Figure Two illustrates how adequate protection payments might violate Timbers of Inwood Forest by awarding the secured creditor more
than the equity cushion_.

11 This was the holding in Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 165
(1946). Whether this case is still good law will be discussed in the next section.
" Represented by line BX.
'
u Represented by line DZ on the right ordinate. DZ is broken into two parts. The secured claim
representing postpctition interest is CD. The secured claim representing original principal is CZ. BX
- CZ - $900.
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E -Sl,000

A-$1,000

o· -s994.26
D-$990

.. . c• - s930
:: : C-$900

B-$990

Adequate

Protection
lu,medy

E'=$790

__
__
__
_,y
x-o .__
__
___
__.__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___.z- o
Ovenecured

Undersecured

rB Depreciation
!:al Debtor Equity
[I Interest (as if it were accrued)

• Principal

Figure Two

INADEQUATE EQUITY CUSHION AND PERIODIC PAYMENT OF
INTEREST

In this case, the collateral depreciates in value from $1,000 to $790.
This is shown by the declining slope of AE*. Meanwhile, postpetition
interest is not allowed to accrue. Rather, the trustee periodically pays the
oversecured party in cash. Over the course of the year, these payments
equal $90. Therefore, the postpetition entitlements in both Figure One
and Figure Two are precisely identical. 111
.. Because postpetition interest is paid out periodically instead of accrued against the collateral,
the secured creditor can reinvest the $90 and earn a return, which is in effect the interest on interest
that federal law apparently prohibits. See infra notes 229-245 and accompanying text. For example,
assume an interest rate of 10%, so that the trustee pays interest of $7 .50 per month at the end of each
month. If the secured pany invests this sum and obtains continually compounding 10% interest on the
investment, the formula for the secured party's total return (V) is as follows:
12
V

= 900 + ~ 7.5ex
t-1

where x

.1 [

1

-i]
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Notice that after point Yin time, the equity cushion has depreciated
below the amount of interest dollars actually paid out. After point Y, the
now undersecured creditor receives postpetition interest beyond the
amount of the equity cushion. 80 Potentially, adequate protection schemes
such as the one illustrated in Figure Two violate Timbers of Inwood Forest. Whether they do, however, depends on what property rules are presupposed. with respect to equity cushions.
There are three such presuppositions. The first view holds that the
secured party is entitled to adequate protection of the equity cushion as it
existed_at the start of the bankruptcy (AB). Therefore, payment of interest past time Y is appropriate because the total eventually paid out (DC) is
still less than the initial cushion (AB). 81 This view of the equity cushion
was taken in Hamilton Bank v. Diaconx Corp. (In re Diaconx Corp.). 81
Although some courts might become squeamish about awarding
unaccrued interest, the preservation of the equity cushion would not constitute the award of any such thing. Rather, a court would be protecting
the oversecured party's rights under Section 506(b) to utilize the equity
cy.shion for postpetition interest as it eventually accrues. 88 Meanwhile, the
and where t - number of months it takes before the secured party receives the payment.
According to this formula, the secured party's rights in bankruptcy (given monthly payments of
17.50 for one year) arc worth $994.259985.
ao Su Tokai Bank of Calif. v. Old Town Historic Bldg., Ltd. (/n re Old Town Historic Bldg.,
Ltd.), 79 Bankr. 8 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987) (with no depreciation proven, interest payments to thinly
secured creditor awarded as adequate protection); In re Noyes, 62 Bankr. 115, 117 (Bankr. D. Neb.
1986) (both interest and payments covering depreciation awarded); United States v. Smithfield Estates, Inc. (In re Smithfield Estates, Inc.), 48 Bankr. 910, 915 (Bankr. D.R.l. 1985) (in light of thin
equity, debtor ordered to pay interest and principal as per contract).
11 The total paid out (DC) is less than the initial equity cushion (AB) by an amount of ED (AB
- EC; EC - DC - ED) .
u 69 Bankr. 333 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987). To be precise, it was not interest that was anticipated,
but attorneys' fees and collection expenses, the second branch of the secured creditor's § 506(b) entitlements. Id. at 339. Nevertheless, the principle can be used analogously for postpetition interest as well.
Id. at 339 n.9.
11 In potential support of this proposition is an argument made by Judge Hargrove:
When two parties contract, they arc free to deal with one another as they please.
Therefore, when a security interest is granted, the party granting the security interest is
fully cognizant of both the value of the underlying obligation and the value of the security
interest which is placed "at risk" in the event that party fails to pay. On the other side of
this transaction, the party receiving the security interest is free to demand security of sufficient value to cover any anticipated exposure caused by the other party's failure to perform
on the underlying obligation. Section 506(b) merely respects the party's contractual rights
by allowing the secured party the full extent of his bargained for security.
In rt D.W.G.K. Restaurants, Inc., 84 Bankr. 684, 686 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1988). This argument,
however, fails to sec a key point. The contractual right of an ovcrsecurcd creditor can, at best, be in
the nature of a negative pledge covenant-itself an unsecured claim and not a property claim. Nothing
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equity cushion as preserved at the time of the initial valuation will constitute the limit of postpetition interest that an undersecured party can receive," a principle fully consistent with Timbers of Inwood Forest.
The idea of preserving the equity cushion was rejected in at least one
case under the old Bankruptcy Act. 111 In In re -Apollo Travel, Inc.," a
secured creditor sought to preserve an equity cushion for attorneys' fees
which had not yet accrued. 17 In that case, Judge Gibson, looking to state
law, held that the bankruptcy trustee had a senior claim to the secured
party for the equity cushion." The cushion could not be preserved for the
secured party's future benefit.
A problem with the view that preserves the equity cushion at the
start of the bankruptcy proceeding "for interest or collection expenses not
yet accrued" is that the trustee is being excluded from property of the
bankrupt estate, on which the secured party does not yet have a claim.
Accordingly, a second view of the equity cushion rejects the need to set
aside debtor equity for postpetition interest that has not yet accrued. This
view would also prohibit, at any given time, the invasion of the secured
claim as it presently existed, as augmented by any postpetition interest or
collection expenses that may have accrued. Thus, in Figure Two, even
though the trustee can use the entire equity cushion at or near the time of
the bankruptcy petition,81 this right shrinks over time until it disappears
at time Y.40 After time Y, depreciation is invading the secured claim, so
that the trustee must provide adequate protection for the now underprevents the debtor from conveying the full amount of the debtor equity away, even if such a conveyance is a violation of the loan agreement. E.g., U.C.C. § 9-311 (1989). If this occurs, the right to have
collateral to secure accruing interest is an unsecured claim. Judge Hargrove needs to explain why this
unsecured claim should be honored in bankruptcy when bankruptcy's essence is to dishonor unsecured
claims generally. Stt Carlson, supra note 10, at 632.
.. Using Figure One, the idea would be that the trustee must never interfere with the secured
party's right to realize DZ on the day the Chapter 11 plan is confirmed. Therefore, the value of the
collateral (and replacement collateral supplied by the trustee in light of depreciation) must never fall
below the line BD. If so, the secured party is entitled to have the automatic stay lifted .
.. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Pub. L. No. 696, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978) .
.. Republic Acceptance Corp. v. Salmen (In re Apollo Travel, Inc.), 567 F.2d 841 (8th Cir.
1977).
"Id. at 842.
u Id. at 844-47.
" For example, the trustee might obtain a loan from a postpetition creditor in exchange for a
super priority lien. See 11 U.S.C. § 364(d) (1988). The proceeds of the loan would enrich the general
creditors, while the super priority lien would block any further accrual of postpetition interest.
'° The invasion right shrinks because the value of the property decreases due to depreciation
(AC*) and the secured claim, increases because postpetition interest and collection expenses arc accruing (BC*).
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secured creditor if she wishes to keep the automatic stay effective. 41 The
amount of adequate protection required in Figure Two will eventually
reach S930 (YC*)."1
This view mediates between two potentially conflicting bankruptcy
principles. The first principle holds that the debtor's equity is property of
the estate. As such, it should be available for use by the estate, even if the
use interferes with the future accrual of intcrest. 0 The second principle is
that secured parties are entitled to adequate protection for their secured
claims."" If the .trustee may not invade the collateral needed to support
accrued postpetition interest (without supplying adequate protection),
then the policy of adequate protection is vindicated as well.
If this second view of the equity cushion is adopted, then the interest
payments in Figure Two violate Timbers of Inwood Forest. In Figure
" 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (1988) (the court shall lift the stay "for cause, including the lack of
adequate protection of an interest in property of such a party in interest").
•• Because· the secured party did receive some cash up to time Y, the secured claim has a greater
value to the secured creditor than $930. If we assume that time Y is four months after the bankruptcy
petition, and if we assu·mc that adequate protection is in the form of replacement collateral (rather
than more cash payments), then the total return is calculated as follows:
4

V - 900 +

~

7.5cx

t-1

where x -

/

.1 [

1 - ~]

This amounts to $932.37295.
If adequate protection is accomplished through cash payments, .11 U.S.C. § 361(1) (1988), the
secured party's claim is worth even more because now the secured party can cam continuously compounding interest on the adequate protection payments as well. Since the above assumptions reveal the
collateral to be depreciating by St 7.50 per month, and if we assume that in the fifth month the trustee
stops interest payments of $7.50 per month and commm~es adequate protection payments of $17.50,
the value of the secured claim is as follows:
12

4

V -

900 - 140 +

~
t-1

7.5cx +

~

17.5cx

t-5

1--t]
12
V - 900 - 140+320.37295+144.16974 - 936.54269.
" See In re Triplett, 87 Bankr. 25, 27 (Bankr. W.D. Texas 1988) (secured party had no right
to complain that the debtor-in-possession was using the equity cushion).
•• See 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (1988).
where x -

.1 [
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Two, the secured party is oversecured between time X and Y and undersecured between times Y and Z. For courts wishing to establish the equity
cushion as the limit of interest for the oversecured party, periodic interest
can be paid only until time Y.
Instead of the accrual of postpetition interest, the bankruptcy trustee's concern now turns to adequate protection. If the bankruptcy trustee
invades the secured claim, the secured party is entitled to have the automatic stay lifted unless the trustee supplies adequate protection against
further depreciation. In Figure Two, this is accomplished by providing
the secured creditor with aclditional collateral starting at time Y. 0 Meanwhile, the effect on income of the total scheme is beneficial to the trustee.
The trustee's expense of retaining the collateral is reduced because, after
time Y, the trustee is relieved of the need to pay out interest.••
So far, this article has presented two views on the law of Section
506(b). The first view favors the secured creditor because it required preserving for her enough equity cushion to cover postpetition interest that
has not yet accrued. Under the second view, just presented, the set-aside of
debtor equity was rejected. Instead, the trustee could use the equity for the
benefit of the estate as long as she did not invade the secured claim as it
existed at any given time. There is also a third view, which is more radically favorable to the debtor and prejudicial to secured parties. According
to this third view, the trustee in bankruptcy may invade that part of the
secured claim that represents postpetition interest or postpetition collection
expenses. Only the secured claim at the start of bankruptcy (BX) is entitled to adequate protection. Even at time Z, the trustee can still use the
full equity cushion (EC) for estate purposes.
According to this view, Section 506(b) means that the oversecured
creditor gets postpetition interest only if, by the time of confirmation or
sale of the collateral, the trustee has failed to expropriate or depreciate the
equity cushion. That is, so long as the initial secured claim, representing
prepetition claims, is protected, an oversecured party has no right to com•• This extra collateral is represented by CD*. The trustee could also pay the secured creditor
CD*. This, however, is not illustrated in Figure Three. For a mathematical illustration of adequate
protection payments and its effect on the value of secured claims, see supra note 42 and accompanying
text.
•• This is so even if the trustee must pay adequate protection in cash. In supra note 42, while
the cost of four months' postpetition interest was $32.37 , the cost of eight months' adequate protection
was only $4.17. This was so even though the monthly interest payment ($7.50) was far less than the
monthly adequate protection payment ($17.50). The solution to this apparent paradox is that postpetition interest adds to the principal of $900, whereas adequate protection payments are deemed to be
retirement of principal.
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plain about a shrinking equity cushion. This anti-creditor view has been
adopted by some court~. 47
Surprisingly, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 probably supported this
view. Prior to 1978, there was no express statutory right to adequate protection. Instead, the secured party simply hoped that the value of the collateral did not deteriorate over time. Therefore, so long as the trustee still
controlled the collateral, she had no adequate protection obligation at all
to secured creditors for either the original secured claim or the claim for
postpetition interest. ' 8 On the other hand, courts often lifted the stay in
bankruptcy if the secured party claimed the stay to be prejudicial." Such
a request, however, was within the discretion of the court to deny. 110 If the
stay was lifted, then the secured party could obtain a form of postpetition
interest by obtaining and reinvesting cash proceeds from a ·nonbankruptcy
sale of the collateral. 111 Therefore, prior to 1978, oversecured creditors did
receive postpetition interest albeit through lifting the stay. It is not exactly
the case that bankruptcy trustees could invade secured claims at will because such an invasion was grounds to lift the stay.
Even if the trustee could invade the secured claim, the current statute
expressly requires adequate protection,81 thereby overruling any implicit
rule to the contrary under the former Bankruptcy Act. The addition of a
specific obligation of adequate protection, coupled with the Section 506(b)
interest as part of the secured claim, should eliminate this third anticreditor view of the equity cushion.
To summarize, Figure Two shows the problems caused when the
trustee pays out postpetition interest. If the second, middle view of the
equity cushion is adopted-under which the trustee may use the equity
cushion but may not invade the accrued secured claim-then these payments violate Timbers of Inwood Forest. What is needed is a way for the
trustee to stop postpetition interest after time Y.
" See McCombs Properties VI, Ltd. v. First Tex. Sav. Ass'n (In re McCombs Properties VI,
Ltd.), 88 Bankr. 261, 266 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988); In re National Computer -Communications
Corp., 85 Bankr. 6 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1988); In re Sun Valley Ranches, Inc., 38 Bankr. 595, 598
(Bankr. D . Idaho 1984). This anti-creditor view of the equity cushion is developed in O'Toole, Adequate Protection and Postpetition Interest in Chapter 11 Proceedings, 56 AM. BANKR. L.J. 251,
267, 270-72, 274 (1982).
•• For a history of adequate protection before the 1898 Act, sec Carlson, supra note 10, at 58184.
•• Id. at 590-96.
"Id.
11 Id.
11 See 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1988).
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B. Purchases in Lieu of Payments
This potentially tricky accounting problem can be solved by characterizing the payments of interest not as payments at all, but as purchases
by the trustee of the secured party's secured claim for the amount of the
postpetition interest in question. That is, the interest debt created by Section 506(b) would not be paid at all, in the sense of extinguishing antecedent debt, but would be sold. This idea would help the trustee determine
when the entitlement cushion has disappeared and when further interest
"payments" (that is, further purchases of the secured claim for interest)
should cease. At this time (time Y, in Figure Two), the secured party
would hold a secured claim for the principal amount of her debt, 11 and
the trustee would hold a security interest for any postpetition interest of
the senior secured party. These two security interests would be pari passu
with each other in that the trustee is buying a portion of the secured
party's entire claim.
Buying the secured claim (to the extent of postpetition interest) when
the collateral is depreciating in value is especially superior to simply paying it. For example, if payments are deemed to extinguish postpetition
interest, represented in Figure Three as BY, interest does not accrue at all,
and the equity cushion lasts longer. That is, Y shifts over to become Y"'.

11 To be more precise, the secured party would hold a secured claim for the principal and any
accrued prepetition interest.
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THE EFFECT ON THE EQUITY CUSHION OF

p AYING

INTEREST

PERIODICALLY

The suggestion being made here-pre-confirmation payments to
oversecured parties should not be payments at all but purchases of secured debt-would prevent the over-accrual of interest and avoid a violation of Timbers of Inwood Forest. If the trustee owned a security interest
for the amount of CC*, it would then be clear that, at time Y, the equity
cushion was exhausted, and hence no further postpetition interest entitlements could be given to the now undersecured party. 54
.. Under the solution proposed here , the secured claim was worth $932.37295 (if adequate protection payments were made and collateral substituted). If the bankruptcy court allows time Y to shift
rightward and become time Y"' , then the secured claim is worth more. For example, if line YY"'
represents an additional month of postpctition interest, the secured claim increases in value to
$940.32346. An increased adequate protection obligation represented by line CC* would offset this
increase in the value of the secured claim, but, as seen in supra note 42, the cost of postpctition
interest payments far exceeds the cost of adequate protection payments where the equity cushion is of
a comparable size. Of course, neither adequate protection nor postpctition interest need be paid in
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WHAT INTEREST RATE SHOULD OVERSECURED CREDITORS
RECEIVE?

Section 506(b)'s Indeterminacy

Postpetition interest entitlements under Section 506(b) are not the
only situations requiring a choice of the proper interest rate for oversecured creditors. A reorganization plan may require such a choice as
well. A plan may provide secured parties with debt instruments (in lieu of
cash or release of the collateral), which must have an appropriate discount
rate. With regard to discount rates for reorganization plans, the point is to
equate the present value of the debt instruments with the present value of
the secured party's collateral. 11 Given such a goal, the choice of an interest
rate ought to be entirely technical. 18 The only concern is that the debt
instruments have a present value equal to the amount of the secured
claim.
The interest rate contemplated by Section 506(b) does not necessarily
concern preserving the present value of the secured claim, and therefore
the choice of rates is not necessarily technical. Section 506(b) provides:
To the extent [there is an equity cushion,) there shall be allowed to the
holder of such claim, interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs,
or charges provided for under · the agreement under which such claim
arose.117

As previously discussed, the Supreme Court in United States v. Ron
Pair Enterprises, Inc.," held that the contract governs for fees and costs,
while the right to postpetition interest is purely noncontractual.&e Therecash at all, but may simply be accrued and added to enlarge the secured claim in bankruptcy.
16 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (1988) ("each holder of a claim of such class [must] receive
on account of such claim deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed amount of such claim, of
a value, as of the effective date of the plan, of at least the value of such holder's interest in the estate's
interest in such property"). But cf. Note, Deferred Cash Paymmts to Secured Creditors in Cram
Down of Chapter 11 Plans: A Matin of Interest, 63 WASH. L. REV. 1041 (1988) [hereinafter A
Matter of Interest] (a refreshing, if naive, suggestion that if risk-free treasury rates were used, more
reorganizations would be feasible, and litigation costs would be reduced) .
.. See United States v. Southern States Motor Inns, Inc. (/n re Southern States Motor Inns,
Inc.), 709 F.2d 647, 652-53 (11th Cir. 1983), urt. dmied, 465 U.S. 1022 (1984); In re Wilkinson,
33 Bankr. 933, 935-36 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983). See gmerally Carbiener, Presmt Value in Bankruptcy: The Search for an Appropriate Cramdoum Discount Rau, 32 S.D.L. REv. 42 (1987). Market rates of interest arc discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 60-86.
17 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1988) .
.. 109 S. Ct. 1026 (1989).
" See id. at 1028-29.
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fore, it ought to be open for a court to choose some rate other than the one
specified in the contract. But how to choose?
One alternative would be to replicate for the oversecured party "what
would have happened if no bankruptcy." This exercise is the fundamental
premise of valuing the collateral,80 and it could easily be borrowed to determine the proper rate of interest. Nevertheless, such an exercise is
highly indeterminate. 81 If what would have happened is a foreclosure sale,
receipt of cash proceeds, and reinvestment, then the rate of interest ought
to be the market rate, not the contract rate. 81 Suppose, however, that the
rate agreed upon in the loan contract is higher than market. Then, in our
hypothetical universe, perhaps an oversecured party would not foreclose.
Instead, she would sit tight for a while and let the lucrative interest accrue. These observations could justify a decision to give the secured party
the higher of contract or market rates. 83
The opposite, however, might be true. If the contract rate is low,
then, in a hypothetical no-bankruptcy world, a debtor might keep payments current to prevent default and keep the collateral from being foreclosed. Now default is broadly defined in many agreements to include financial insolvency and the like, so we are supposing that the creditor,
receiving regular (below-market) payments, would nevertheless not declare a default. Such an additional assumption, however, is not precluded

"° See Flaschen, Adequate Protection for Oversecured Creditors, 61 AM. BANKR. L.J. 341, 346
(1987) (discussing the relation between the valuation of collateral and the existence of equity cushions). See generally D. Carlson, Valuations of Collateral in Bankruptcy (unpublished manuscript)
(currently being drafted) [hereinafter D. Carlson).
"' See D. Carlson, supra note 60.
11 Fortgang & Mayer, Valuation in Bankruptcy, 32 UCLA L. REV . 1061, 1082 (1985) [hereinafter Fortgang & Mayer); cf. Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 164
(1946) (asserting as a reason for no post-bankruptcy interest, the equitable treatment among creditors
who charged differing rates in their contracts). The equity mentioned by Vanston would be achieved
by making even oversccured creditors take an equalizing market rate .
.. See In re 433 South Beverly Drive, 117 Bankr. 563, 576 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990) (permitting
higher of pre-default contract or market rates, not on the basis of counterfactual speculation, but "[ i]n
the interest of balancing the preservation of contract rights with the need to compensate for actual
damages incurred.. . ."); In re Jewell, 25 Bankr. 44, 47 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982) (allowing oversecured creditors to select which discount factor to use). In In re Loveridge Mach. & Tool Co., 36
Bankr. 159 (Bankr. D. Utah 1983), Judge Clark ruled that § 506(b) docs not require the contract
rate, but the contract rate was nevertheless appropriate. Id. at 162-65. Even though there was no
express sign of hypothetical speculation regarding what would have happened if no bankruptcy proceeding had occurred, an implicit exercise docs occur. Id. Judge Clark worried that unless the contract
rate was used, one side or the other would receive a "windfall." Id. at 163. This comment reveals a
hypothetical vision of a world without bankruptcy in which the contract is allowed to continue by both
sides of the transaction.

1990]

Postpetition Interest

399

by the rules of counterfactual speculation94 (although many would find
such creditor acquiescence as "not natural")." In addition, it is a wellestablished policy of bankruptcy law to invalidate contract clauses that
allow default or acceleration based on the debtor's bankruptcy or insolvency alone ... Perhaps the zeal to do so will infect practices in the hypothetical universe. These observations support the view that the secured
party should get the lower between the contract and the market rate.
Such a decision-giving the debtor the benefit of the lower between
market and contract interest rates-partly resembles another key idea in
Chapter 11, the notion of "disimpairment" or "deceleration." Deceleration is realized by satisfying all of the contractual claims of a creditor,
including the cure of past defaults and the payment of whatever postpetition interest is provided for in the loan agreement. 17 As a result, if all of
the contractual terms are met, then the creditor is not impaired18 and thus
has no right to vote on the plan." Because this is so, there is no need to
give a now disimpaired creditor the present value of her collateral. That
is, if the contract rate of interest is promised in a plan which cures all past
defaults, the plan can be confirmed even though the disimpaired creditor
would be better off with the market rate. 70
There are some key differences between postpetition interest under
deceleration and postpetition interest under Section 506(b). First, while
deceleration clearly requires the contract rate, Section 506(b) does not so
.. The counterfactual exercise is simply the speculation 0£ what would have happened if the facts
had been otherwise, in other words, no bankruptcy.
11 A contract rate lower than the market rate was suggested in dictum in Crocker Nat'I Bank v.
American Mariner Indus., Inc. (In re American Mariner Indus., Inc.), 734 F.2d 426, 435 n.12 (9th
Cir. 1984) (dealing with an undersecured creditor), but the counterfactual reasoning for this conclusion was absent. The reasoning in the text is "logically" possible but is not meant to represent what
most practitioners 0£ the counterfactual speculation would in fact produce if they went through the
governing "what-ir' exercise. See Cardinal Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Colegrove (In re Colegrove),
771 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1985) (cure as part 0£ disimpairment under § 1325(b)(S)).
11 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 364(b)(2), 365(d)(t), 365(e), 541(c)(t) (1988); see also 2 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 1 365.06, at 365-46 - 365-49 (15th ed. 1989).
" See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1124, 1322(b)(S) (1988). In curing all defaults, § 1124 makes it clear that
defaults based on filings for bankruptcy and the like do not have to be cured. .11 U.S.C. § 1124(2)(A)
(1988). The section also undoes any acceleration clause. Hence, the term deceleration is born (though
sometimes the term "disimpair" is heard).
11 11 u.s.c. § 1124 (1988) .
.. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8)(B). The concept is much like the assumption 0£ an executory contract
in bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1988).
'° Furthermore, if the loan contract contains a low predefault rate and a high postdefault rate,
the debtor-in-possession is entitled to the lower predefault rate if it disimpairs the secured party by
curing all past defaults. Great Western Bank & Trust v. Entz-White Lumber & Supply, Inc. (In re
Entz-White Lumber & Supply, Inc.), 850 F.2d 1338, 1342-43 (9th Cir. 1988).
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clearly require it. 71 Accordingly, where the market rate is better for the
trustee than the contract rate, deceleration provides no means to capture
this favorable market rate, whereas Section 506(b), because it is sufficiently indeterminate, may allow for this. Second, deceleration does not
place a ceiling on the interest a secured party can receive, whereas Section
506(b) contains such a ceiling-that is, the secured party can obtain interest only until the debtor's equity is exhausted. 71 This discussion emphasizes how indeterminate Section 506(b) is if we rely on counterfactuals to
determine the "right" rate of interest. We can see that the counterfactual
speculation could lead to a high contract rate, a low contract rate, or a
market rate.
For those secured parties who obtain a money judgment before bankruptcy, some courts have held that the secured agreement is subsumed into
the judgment, so that the secured party may obtain only the legal rate of
interest after the judgment. 78 These rulings seem only partially consistent
with the counterfactual exercise of "what would have happened if no
bankruptcy." Eventually, the judgment would be enforced; the secured
party would get the cash and would (presumably) reinvest it at market
rates. After this point, a market rate would seem to be appropriate.
In addition, if the contract has been merged with the judgment, it
should also be the case that no "agreement" exists whereby the secured
party could obtain post-judgment attorneys' fees. 74 This seems to have
eluded some courts. 711 But this issue was addressed forthrightly by Judge
Scholl in Stendardo v. Federal National Mortgage Association (In re
" See supra notes 56-86 and accompanying text.
71 See United States Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365,
372-73 (1988); In re LHD Realty Corp., 726 F.2d 327, 331-32 (7th Cir. 1984).
•• See, e.g., In re Roach, 824 F .2d 1370, 1377 (3d Cir. 1987) (mortgage contract merges with a
judgment of foreclosure, and the mortgage contract rate is extinguished); Presque Isle Apts., L.P. v.
Landmark Sav. Assocs. (In re Presque Isle Apts., L.P.), 112 Bankr. 744, 747 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1990); In re Rorie, 98 Bankr. 215, 218, 221 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989); Smith v. Kissell Co. (In re
Smith), 92 Bankr. 127, 130-31 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988), rro'd on other grounds, 98 Bankr. 708 (E.D.
Pa. 1989); Herbert v. Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n (In re Herbert), 86 Bankr. 433, 436-38 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1988); In re McKillips, 81 Bankr. 454, 456 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987); cf. In re Singer Island
Hotel, Ltd., 95 Bankr. 845 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989) (loan reduced to judgment may be decelerated
under § 1124). For cases using the legal rate in the absence of any evidence of the market rate, sec In
re C & P Gray Farms, Inc., 70 Bankr. 704, 707 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987); American Bank v. Coburn
(In re Coburn), 36 Bankr. 550, 551 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983).
" In re McKillips, 81 Bankr. 454, 455-57 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987) (barring collection expenses
provided in the mortgage agreement, because the agreement was displaced by the judgment); Schlecht
v. Alaska (In re Alaska), 36 Bankr. 236 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1983) (same).
70 Presque Isle Apts., L.P. v. Landmark Sav. Assocs. (In re Presque Isle Apts., L.P.), 112
Bankr. 744, 747 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990); In re Rorie, 98 Bankr. 215, 221 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989).
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Stendardo). 1• In Judge Scholl's view, the doctrine of merger is not complete. For example, merger does not eliminate the mortgage lien. 77 Moreover, Judge Scholl thought that the loan agreement itself was competent to
repeal the doctrine of merger. 71 Therefore, with the doctrine of merger
palpably incomplete, Judge Scholl felt free to hold the clause allowing
fees, costs, and charges to be one of those terms which survives the doctrine of merger. 71
Judge Leif Clark also favored the legal rate in In re Laymon,•0 even
though no judgment of foreclosure had been obtained in state law. Clark
took the strong position that Ron Pair disenfranchised the contract rate
under Section 506(b).11 But he showed no patience for subjunctive
counterfactual speculation about what would have happened absent bankruptcy.11 Instead, he thought that the federal legal rate should always apply, because the secured party's claim _in bankruptcy is analogous to a
•• 117 Bankr. 833 (Bankr. E.D . Pa. 1990).
•• Id. at 838.
•• Id . Judge Scholl quoted from the In re Rorie opinion, "'[u]nless the mortgage agreement
provides otherwise, postjudgment interest accrues at the lawful rate.'" 117 Bankr. at 841 (quoting In
re Rorie, 98 Bankr. 215, 219 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989)). Another bankruptcy judge concluded: "[o)nce
a claim is reduced to judgment, the legal rate of interest applies unless the documents evidence a clear
intent to continue the contractual rate of interest post-judgment.'' Presque Isle Apts., L.P. v.
Landmark Sav. Assocs. (In re Presque Isle Apts., L.P.), 112 Bankr. 744, 747 (Bankr. W .D. Pa.
1990).
If the meaning of these cases cited by Judge Scholl is that the agreement must specifically refer to
postjudgment interest in order to displace the doctrine of merger, it should be noted that nothing in
the FNMA agreement before Judge Scholl reserved the right to charge fees, costs, or charges after a
judgment of foreclosure.
•• The charges in question were taxes and insurance premiums paid by FNMA, both costs that
directly benefited the debtor. Judge Scholl went on to declare that even if he were wrong on the
matter of merger, FNMA would still prevail under the doctrine of unjust enrichment. 117 Bankr. at
840.
For some cogent criticism of the merger doctrine as a mode of solving bankruptcy problems, sec
Note, The Chapter 13 Cure Provisions: A Doctrine in Need of a Cure, 74 MINN. L. REV. 921, 94245 (1990).
" 117 Bankr. 856 (Bankr. W .D. Tex. 1990).
" Id. at 858-59.
11 Judge Clark wrote:
The court recognizes that one alternative analysis might be offered to support an
award of contract interest to the oversecured creditor, on the theory that the equity in the
collateral outside bankruptcy would take subject to that contract interest claim. The result,
would go the logic, should be no different in bankruptcy.
This argument docs not account for the operation of section 502, however. All creditors, including ovcrsecured creditors, arc deemed to have an allowed claim as of the bankruptcy filing which is the functional equivalent of a federal judgment against the estate's
assets .. ..
Id. at 864 (emphasis added).
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judgment in a federal court. Judge Clark was inspired to make this ruling
by Bankruptcy Code Section 726(a)(5), one of the provisions governing
the distribution of the bankrupt estate to the general creditors. 81 According to Section 726(a)(5), if all the creditors have been paid, they are further entitled to interest compensation at the legal rate out of the surplus.
This rejection of the contract rate by Section 726(a)(5) reveals a bankruptcy policy of equal treatment as extended to interest rates, including
interest rates under Section 506(b). 14 Furthermore, a policy of national
uniformity made the federal legal rate superior to various state legal
rates."
To summarize, Ron Pair makes it clear that courts are not required,
and perhaps are forbidden, to award the contract interest rate. The "what
if' exercise that is so common in bankruptcy jurisprudence may be indeterminate, but it at least provides a theory for courts to follow. 88 Competing with the "what if' test is Judge Clark's well-reasoned opinion in
favor of the federal legal rate, on the theory that what is equitable for
general creditors facing a surplus is equitable for secured creditors facing
excess equity cushions.

B. When Does Interest Begin to Accrue?

Assuming that a secured party is entitled .to postpetition interest, another conceptual question must be faced: when does postpetition interest
u 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(S) (1988).

According to Judge Clark:
There is no good reason why one unsecured creditor should receive a greater share of
the Section 726(a)(S) "pie" solely by virtue of its prepetition contract interest rate when
the rationale for paying interest under Section 726(a)(S) has nothing to do with the prcpetition contracts of the debtor.
We thus learn from this analysis the third basic principle which should inform our
decision making on the issue at hand: Postpetition interest awards should be consistent
with the principle of equitable, ratable distribution of estate assets to estate creditors.
Id. at 861.
u Id. at 117 .
.. Judge King (nee Randall), in the court of appeals decision of Timbers of Inwood Forest, listed
all of the unverifiable countcrfactuals a court would have to invent if undersecured parties had the
right to post-bankruptcy interest, implying that if such countcrfactuals arc necessary, the post-bankruptcy interest entitlement must not exist. United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest
Assocs., Ltd. (In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd.), 793 F.2d 1380, 1402-05 (5th Cir.
1986), affd en bane, 808 F.2d 363 (1987), affd, 484 U.S. 365 (1988). The entire Bankruptcy Code,
however, is built upon counterfactual exercises-whenever the concept of value is relied upon, a court
must undertake such exercises. Therefore, the suggestion that courts must speculate in this manner
docs not seem to be a persuasive argument against post-petition interest for undersecured parties.
14
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begin to accrue?
We have already discussed the well-established impulse of courts to
replicate what would have happened under state law if there had been no
bankruptcy. When it seemed as if undersecured parties might obtain
postpetition interest as part of adequate protection, courts frequently ruled
that interest should begin to accrue only when, in a hypothetical universe
of no bankruptcy, the secured party would have foreclosed on collateral,
received cash, and reinvested the cash. 87 Of course, this line of cases is all
but overruled by Timbers of Inwood Forest. 88
Oversecured creditors are not necessarily governed by the same
counterfactual exercise; rather, they are governed by the language of Section 506(b), which mandates postpetition interest for undersecured parties.89 On the other hand, we have already seen that the Supreme Court,
in United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc. ,90 has ruled that an oversecured party's right to interest is not governed by the loan agreement. 91
Perhaps this reintroduces the speculative exercise that _the adequate protection doctrine had earlier demanded. 93
17 See, e.g., Northwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers (In re Ahlers), 794 F.2d 388, 396 (8th Cir.
1986) (later between time of motion to lift stay or when cash would have been received if no bankruptcy, or, if foreclosure had started before bankruptcy, simply when the cash would have been received and reinvested), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 485 U.S. 197 (1988); Crocker Nat'!
Bank v. American Mariner Indus., Inc. (In re American Mariner Indus., Inc.), 734 F.2d 426, 435
n.12 (9th Cir. 1984) ("to avoid overcompensating the secured creditor, the timing of adequate protection should' take account of the usual time and expense involved in repossession and sale of collateral"); Greives v. Bank of Western Ind. (In re Greives), 81 Bankr. 912, 964 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1987)
(but following the rule that interest starts when the creditor makes a motion to lift the stay); In re
Asbridge, 66 Bankr. 894, 900-01 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1986) ("Payments to protect a creditors' right to a
reinvestment return on foreclosure proceeds ... should not begin until, under state law, the creditor
could have . . . reinvested the proceeds.").
The decisions that refuse to award interest until the secured party moves to lift the stay reflect
the view that an undersecured party is not entitled to adequate protection until she asks for it. See
supra text accompanying notes 48-51. In the context of oversccured parties, this view is irrelevant
because the right of an oversecurcd party to postpetition interest is not dependent on adequate
protection.
11 Technically, Timbers of Inwood Forest rejected the claim that adequate protection required
postpetition interest for undersecured parties. United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v: Timbcrs of Inwood Forest
Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 370-80 (1988). There was a second line of cases which held that interest
awards for undersecured parties might be awarded as a matter of judicial discretion. See, e.g., In re
Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 396. Perhaps this line of cases still lives, though I would not bet on it.
" See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
00 489 U.S. 235 (I 989).
11 See supra notes 13-22 and accompanying text.
11 See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text. For a case expressly rejecting this counterfactual enterprise, see In re Laymon, 117 Bankr. 856, 864 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990) (instituting instead
the federal judgment rate).
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If the speculative exercise is reintroduced, it ought to be relatively
clear that interest for the oversecured creditors should accrue from the
beginning of the bankruptcy proceeding. If the contractual rate of interest
is chosen, because one side or the other would have wanted to perpetuate
the interest rate provided .in the . contract, then postpetition interest for
oversecured parties immediately accrues upon the filing of the petition.
The premise is that, but for the bankruptcy, the status quo of the contract
would not have been disturbed. If it is assumed that a foreclosure would
have occurred, justifying a market rate, it must also be assumed that contract interest would have accrued against the collateral between the time
of the bankruptcy petition and the time of the hypothetical foreclosure. 88
Thus, contrary to the now overruled adequate protection cases, the rule
for Section 506(b) ought to be that interest accrues from the very beginning of the bankruptcy proceeding, though perhaps a switch from contract
to market rates eventually becomes appropriate.

C.

Market Rates of Interest

Suppose that it is decided that a secured party is entitled to a market
rate of interest under Section 506(b). How might this rate be identified?
A market rate of interest has three components: (1) a risk-free rate or
opportunity cost (competitively determined); (2) an inflationary component; and (3) a risk premium." As instituted in the bankruptcy courts,
these factors have been described or ignored in a wide variety of ways.
Rather than trying to systematize these cases, this article sets forth some
maxims, derived from the case law, that try to capture all or part of these
factors.
(1) Choose the risk-free rate. 96 Risk can be ignored because a bankruptcy court has already determined that the plan is feasible. If risky, it
should not have been confirmed."
"' Remember that we arc dealing with oversecured parties here.
" E. BRIGHAM, FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 60-61 (4th ed. 1986). Properly
speaking, one should also consider the monopoly power a lender has over a borrower, which might
stem from superior knowledge that the actual risk is less than the market perception. Thus, a specific
creditor who charges the market rate might well enjoy a super-competitive profit.
• In re Jewell, 25 Bankr. 44, 46 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982) (approving use of risk-free treasury
rate); stt also In re Corliss, 43 Bankr. 176, 179 (Bankr. D. Or. 1984) (same).
• In re Wilkinson, 33 Bankr. 933, 936-37 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983). Contra Farm Credit Bank
v. Fowler, (In re Fowler), 903 F.2d 694, 698 (9th Cir. 1990) ("(f]inding that a reorganization plan is
feasible does not necessarily mean that the risk of default is small").
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(2) Choose the risk-free rate, but to account for market fluctuations,
take the average treasury rate within six months of the filing of the bankruptcy petition for bonds of a duration similar to that of the reorganization plan. 97
(3) You cannot choose the risk-free "short term treasury rate."18 A
risk factor must be added, but it must not be an arbitrary risk factor." By
virtue of the rules of bankruptcy, however, it should be recognized that
debtors in bankruptcy are less risky, for secured parties, than nonbankrupt debtors. 100
(4) Choose the floating rate set by Congress in Internal Revenue
Code Section 6621, 101 but add a risk factor .101
(5) Choose "the rate which regional lenders of similar loans . . .
would actually charge persons similarly situated to the debtor on the open
market, absent the fact of bankruptcy." 108
(6) You cannot use the unadorned prime rate unless the debtor-inpossession could actually qualify for it in the market. 104
(7) Choose the borrower's cost of funds, plus a premium for the risk
the debtor poses. 1011 This reimburses the creditor for the cost of replacing
07 In re Wilkinson, 33 Bankr. at 936-37 & n.4; cf. In re Loveridge Mach. & Tool Co., 36
Bankr. 159, 170 (Bankr. D. Utah 1983) (add interest to the applicable risk-free rate to compensate
for risks in the plan).
" United States v. Camino Real Landscape Maintenance Contractors, Inc., 818 F.2d 1503, 1506
(9th Cir. 1987). Fortgang and Mayer point out: "Government rates are influenced by the perfect
liquidity of the market for government securit-ies. Interest on treasuries is not subject to state tax. By
contrast, private loans are liquid even if risk-free, and their interest is taxable." Fortgang & Mayer,
supra note 62, at 1118-19.
" In re Fowler, 903 F.2d at 698; In re Park Ave. Partners, L.P., 95 Bankr. 605, 614 (Bankr.
E.D. Wis. 1988). Nevertheless, the process by which risk premiums are chosen is rarely made apparent in the opinions. Su, e.g. , In re Smithfield Estates, Inc., 52 Bankr. 220, 225 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1985)
(asserting a 2% risk premium without further explanation).
10• In re Claeys, 81 Bankr. 985, 993 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1987) (neglecting to explain why this is
so); Note, Compensation for Time Value as Part of Adequate Protection During the Automatic Stay
in Banll,ruptcy, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 305, 324 (1983) (emphasizing the role that the super priority in§
507(b) has in reducing risk to secured parties). Some authorities also assert that the judge's determination of feasibility is evidence of less risk. Su, e.g., Comment, Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978:
Chapter 13 Cramdown of Secured Creditors , 1981 Wis. L. REV. 333, 357 n.131 ; cf In re Wilkinson, 33 Bankr. 933, 937 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (making this determination conclusive evidence of
no risk).
101 The rate charged by the I.R.S. is the rate for short-term federal securities plus 3 percent. Su
26 U.S.C. § 6621(a)(2) (1988).
101 In re Fi-Hi Pizza, Inc., 40 Bankr. 258, 272 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984) (2.5% risk factor).
m In re Shannon, 100 Bankr. 913, 936 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989) (citing cases).
'°' In re Park Ave. Partners, L.P., 95 Bankr. 605, 614 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1988).
'°' In re Hardzog, 74 Bankr. 701, 704 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1987), ajfd, 113 Bankr. 718 (W.D.
Okla. 1989), rev'd, 901 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1990); Campbell v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re
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the funds that the debtor-in-possession withholds.
(8) The proper rate is what the specific creditor would charge on a
similar loan,1" or the average interest rate the specific creditor would
charge to all of its customers. 107
(9) The proper rate is what the specific creditor could earn if that
creditor were given cash and could reinvest it. 108
(10) The proper rate should not be creditor-specific; 108 instead, the
regional rate that creditors generally receive should be used. 110 ·
(11) Absent any information to the contrary, presume the contract
rate 111 or the legal rate. 111
(12) Regardless of the market, use the contract rate: "the parties
agreed it was a fair return to the secured creditor over an extended period
of time. " 111
Campbell), 16 Bankr. 496, 497 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1982).
, .. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Cooper (In re Cooper), 11 Bankr. 391, 394 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1981); In re Trigwcll, 67 Bankr. 808, 810 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986). Judge Robert Kresse! has
remarked:
In light of the fact that the Code sections dealing with deferred plan payments arc intended
to compensate the creditor for the cost associated with the delay in receiving the value of its
secured claim, it makes sense to at least consider what the creditor would cam under similar circumstances.

Kresse!, Calculating the Present Value of Deferred Payments Under a Chapter 12 Plan: A New
Twist to an Old Problem, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 313, 316 (1988). This seems dubious. The purpose of
the cramdown provision, at least where the secured party is to be given debt instruments with a value
equal to the allowed secured claim, is not to compensate the creditor for delay. The purpose is to
equate the value of the debt instruments with the value of the allowed secured claim. 124 CoNG. REC.
Hll ,103 (Sept. 28, 1978); 124 CONG. REC. S17,420 (Oct. 6, 1978).
107 bi re T. Neff, 60 Bankr. 448, 457 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985), aff d, 785 F .2d 1033 (5th Cir.
1986).
100 Gincastro v. Fairlawn Credit Union (/n re Gincastro), 48 Bankr. 662, 666 (Bankr. D.R.I.
1985).
'" In re D . Neff, 89 Bankr. 672, 677 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (rejecting claim that the lender's
usual price is the same as a competitive market rate); In re Wolf, 61 Bankr. 1010, 1012 (Bankr. N.D.
Iowa 1986) (criticizing this standard for locking in exorbitant or unfair rates that a specific creditor
has been able to charge).
11 • Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Whitman, 692 F.2d 427, 431 (6th Cit. 1982).
111 In re Smith, 42 Bankr. 198, 201 (Bankr. N .D . Ga. 1984).
111 In re C & P Gray Farms, Inc., 70 Bankr. 704, 707 (Bankr. W .D . Mo. 1987); Ford Motor
Credit Co. v. Johnston (In re Johnston), 44 Bankr. 667, 670 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984).
111 In re Einspahr, 30 Bankr. 356, 356 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983). This maxim has been criticized
on various grounds. For example, a contract rate reflects anticipated collection expenses, but in bankruptcy, those collection expenses might be different. In re Fisher, 29 Bankr. 542, 545 (Bankr. D.
Kan. 1983). The Fisher court, however, overlooks the fact that bankruptcy itself might have been the
anticipated mode of collecting. See Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 62, at 1120. Also, the market may
have changed, or the contract may reflect a super-competitive profit. In re Wilkinson, 33 Bankr. 933,
936 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Fisher, 29 Bankr. at 546; see also In re Fisher, 29 Bankr. at 549
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(13) Creditors should not receive a profit. Any profit should be removed from the market rate. 114
(14) Add something to the prime rate to cover inflation. 111
(15) Use the same rate in all cases because it is administratively
convenient. 1141
(16) "The cost of money to the creditor plus a reasonable rate of
return." 117

IV.
A.

"FEES, COSTS, OR CHARGES"

Collection Costs

Not only may oversecured parties obtain postpet1t1on interest, but
they may also obtain "any reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided for
under the agreement under which such claim arose." 118 Of course, such
expenses can only be recovered out of the debtor's equity cushion in the
collateral. 1111 If there is no equity cushion, there is no recovery against the
bankrupt estate.
From the language of Section 506(b), some background assumptions
should be apparent. First, the loan agreement must entitle the secured
party to collect these costs. 110 Thus, whereas Ron Pair emphasizes that
the contract is irrelevant for setting the interest rate, it does quite the
(criticizing " prime rate" on the same grounds). One could, however, defend the presence of profit in a
market rate of interest if the specific lender had an advantage over other lenders because of information or bargaining position.
"' In re Fisher, 29 Bankr. at 546; Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Cooper (In re Cooper), 7 Bankr.
537, 542 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980).
111 In re Bay Area Servs., 26 Bankr. 811 , 814 (Bankr. M .D. Fla. 1982) (10% added). One
would think that the prime rate already includes an inflation factor, which would give the creditor a
double benefit under this formula.
111 In re Fisher, 29 Bankr. at 552 (treasury rate plus 1% in all Chapter 13 cases); In re Fi-Hi
Pizza, 40 Bankr. 258, 272 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984) (federal tax rate plus 2.5% in all cases); see A
Matter of Interest, supra note 55 (arguing generally along these lines). Contra United States v,. Neal
Pharmacal Co., 789 F.2d 1283, 1289 (8th Cir. 1986) (Section 1129(a)(9)(C) compels a case-by-case
analysis); cf. In re Loveridge Mach. & Tool Co-., 36 Bankr. 159, 168 (Bankr. D. Utah 1983) (administrative convenience should be a factor only in Chapter 13, not in Chapter 11 ).
117 In re Burris, 102 Bankr. 822, 825 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1989) (this formula leaves out any
risk factor, which cannot· be characterized as part of a reasonable return).
111 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1988); see supra text accompanying note 9.
111 See 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1988).
11• U.C.C. § 9-504(t)(a) does authorize the collection of sales expense out of the collateral even
if there is no contractual language to this effect, but this ends up being largely irrelevant in bankruptcy unless these expenses have already accrued by the time of bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 362
(1988).
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opposite for "costs, fees and charges provided for under the agreement. " 111
As these fees and charges come directly out of the pocket~ of the general creditors, courts seem to read these agreements stingily. According to
some authorities, if attorneys' fees may be collected in case offoreclosure,
they may not be collected under Section 506(b), at least. where a rehabilitation proceeding does not contemplate a sale free and clear of liens. 111
This particular instance of stinginess seems rather unfair in light of the
fact that the automatic stay prohibits the very foreclosure in question. 111
Second, even if the contract provides for collection, the contract must
be valid and enforceable under state law. 114 Some cases seem to be contrary, asserting that state law is irrelevant, but many of these cases merely
refute the idea that if state law approves of a contract clause, the federal
courts must do likewise. 116 Instead, they could be taken to establish the
111 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1988); In re Laymon, 117 Bankr. 856, 863 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990).
,u Stt, e.g., First Brandon Nat'l Bank v. Kerwin-White (In re Kerwin-White), 109 Bankr. 626,

633 (D. Vt. 1990); In rt Kudlacek, 109 Bankr. 424, 428 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1989) (agreement requires
proceeds actually to be produced before the secured party could receive attorneys' fees); Jackson v.
Boulevard Mortgage Co. (In re Nickleberry), 76 Bankr. 413, 425 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
111 See In re Cuisinarts, Inc., 115 Bankr. 744, 749 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1990) (contract authorizing
collection expenses did not permit secured party to claim reimbursement for the services of investment
banker); In re LaRochc, 115 Bankr. 93, 96-97 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990) (reference in loan agreement
to 38 C.F.R. § 36.4313(b), in which the Veterans Administration agrees to be surety for attorneys'
fees, did not comprise debtor's promise to reimburse these expenses).
'"' In re 433 South Beverly Drive, 117 Bankr. 563, 568 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990); Ferrari v.
Barclays American/Business Credit, Inc. (In re Morse Tool, Inc.), 87 Bankr. 745, 748 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1988).
One important issue under state law is whether a buyer of collateral who is not a party to the
security agreement takes subject to the ability of the secured party to increase the size of the lien by
incurring collection expenses. Suppose, for example, that X signs a security agreement allowing SP to
incur collection expenses which can be added to the amount of the secured claim. X then sells the
collateral to D, and D's property continues to be encumbered by SP's security interest. If SP now
incurs collection expenses, is it chargeable against D's property? For a negative answer in a real
estate case, sec In re Club Assocs., 107 Bankr. 794 (Bankr. N.D ..Ga. 1989). Under the UCC, this
issue turns on the priority assigned to non-advance value. Ste generally Schroeder & Carlson, Future
Nonadvanct Obligations Under Article 9 of the UCC: Legitimate Priority or Unwarranted SqueeuOutr, 102 BANKING L.J. 412 (1985).
111 Stt, e.g., Blackbum-Bliss Trust v. Hudson Shipbuilders, Inc., (In rt Hudson Shipbuilders,
Inc.), 794 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1986); In re Wonder Corp., 72 Bankr. 580, 591 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1987) ("While it is clear that courts must look to the underlying contract as the initial focal point, it is
equally clear that after bankruptcy, it is§ 506(b), not state law, through which that look is focused."),
affd, 82 Bankr. 186 (D. Conn. 1988); In re Elmwood Farm, Inc., 19 Bankr. 338, 341 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("the bankruptcy court need not look_to local law in the context of entitlement to
attorneys' fees").
A typical example of the ambiguity of these cases is Joseph F. Sanson Inv. Co. v. 268 Ltd. (In re
268 Ltd.), 789 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1986), where Judge Goodwin writes:
A concededly unreasonable fee provision might be enforceable under state law, whereas a
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rule that while state law supplies the minimum of what is reasonable,
federal law may intervene to impose a higher standard.
Two important cases, however, are clearly to the contrary, asserting
that it is open for federal bankruptcy law to choose a lower standard than
state law would allow. In Unsecured Creditors' Committee v. Walter E.
Heller & Co., Southeast (In re Stephenson Supply Co.), 118 a North Carolina statute required the creditor to notify the debtor of default. 117 If the
debtor paid within five days, an agreement providing for attorneys' fees is
cancelled. 118 The secured party, however, never gave notice. 119 The court,
nevertheless, awarded attorneys' fees pursuant to the agreement. 180 Judge
Ervin's opinion seems to require that there be at least an agreement, but
the enforcement of that agreement no longer seems to be a. matter of only
state law. 181 Here, federal law approved a fee that state law would have
struck down. 111
The second case, In re A.]. Lane & Co., 118 presents a detailed justification for the position that while the parties must have an agreement,
state law shall be ignored in enforcing this agreement. 184 In that case,
Judge Queenan pointed out that Congress considered an earlier version of
Section 506(b) which contained the language: "to the extent collectible
under applicable law."m This language was deleted in the final version
of Section 506(b), implying that applicable law is now irrelevant. 188
reasonable one might be unenforceable for reasons unrelated to the size of the fee. Thus,
we cannot agree that by requiring that contractual fee agreements be reasonable Congress
meant only that they must be enforceable under [state] law.
Id. at 676. This passage leaves open the possibility that a clause struck down by state law might still
be good under federal law, but the exact claim in that case had been that federal bankruptcy couns
must accept state law's conclusion. Id. at 675-76. The case is ultimately consistent with the view that
while state law sets the minimum standard, the federal standard might be higher.
'" 768 F.2d 580 (4th Cir. 1985).
11• Id. at 581.
, .. Id. at 582 n.3.
, .. Id. at 582.
•ao Id. at 585.
111 Id. at 580 (4th Cir. 1985) ("in rejecting the House version of§ 506(b), Congress intended to
abrogate tl\e pre-existing requirement that attorneys' fees agreements were enforceable only in accordance with state law").
,u Id. at 583-85.
111 113 Bankr. 821 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990).
, .. Id. at 823-25.
111 Id.
'" In describing the newly revised § 506(b), Senator DeConcini and Representative Edwards
both stated: "If the security agreement between the panics provides for attorneys' fees, it will be
enforceable under title 11, notwithstanding contrary law." In re A.J. Lane & Co., 113 Bankr. at 824
(citing 124 CONG. REC. H11095 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1978); 124 CONG. REC. S17211 (daily ed. Oct.
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When it came time to decide the case before him, however, Judge Queenan held a contract clause pertaining to a prepayment penalty unenforceable. Therefore, it was unnecessary to decide whether federal law might
uphold a contract that state law would strike down. 187
Even if courts disagree on whether state law sets a minimum standard of reasonableness, they all agree that the expenses must still be reasonable according to a separate federal standard, not a state law standard.1 .. In addition, secured parties must comply with Bankruptcy Rule
2016(a) 1ae and any local bankruptcy rules that apply to the trustee's at6, 1978)).
'" Other arguments offered by Judge Queenan are less persuasive. Noting that the old Bankruptcy Act did require that the contract pass muster under state public policy, id. at 823 (citing
Security Mortgage Co. v. Powers, 278 U.S. 149, 153-54 (1928)), Judge Queenan felt that the very
enactment of § 506(b) indicated a desire to change this rule. Id. at 824-25. Contrary legislative history
is dismissed by Judge Queenan as " not ... critical." Id. at 824. This argument, however, fails. There
arc many instances where Congress merely codified old law without attempting to change it. Equitable subordination under § 510 is an example. See H. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 359,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6316.
Furthermore, Judge Queenan reasoned that the trustee's attorneys' fees are subject to a "reasonableness" rule, see 11 U.S.C. § 330(a}(l} (1988), that is clearly federal. 113 Bankr. at 825. Therefore,
Congress must have intended a similar federal standard for § 506(b}. Id. Even if Congress had such
an intent, it remains to be established whether Congress intended to preempt state law, allowing
contract clauses (pertaining to attorneys' fees of other matters) which have been condemned by state
policy to survive in federal court.
, .. Dalessio v. Pauchon (In rt Dalessio), 74 Bankr. 721 , 723 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987); In re
Wonder Corp., 72 Bankr. 580, 591 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1987), ajfd, 82 Bankr. 186 (D. Conn. 1988).
For minute detail concerning what is reasonable with regard to attorneys' fees, see In u Tavern
Motor Inn, Inc., 69 Bankr. 138, 143 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1986). An important requirement of reasonableness is that time records be complete. In re Kroh Bros. Dev. Co., 105 Bankr. 515, 525-26 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1989).
Three authors claim that pre-petition attorneys' fees are not subject to the federal "reasonableness" test. Klausner, Pachulski & Godshall, Chapter I 1-Tht Banh of Last Resort, 45 Bus. LAW.
261 , 277 (1989) [hereinafter The Banh of Last Resort]. Bankruptcy courts, however, are courts of
equity and would seem to have plenty of power to subordinate or even to disallow unreasonable prepetition attorneys' fees.
·
"' Bankruptcy Rule 2016(a) provides:
(a) Application for Compensation or Rnmbursement. An entity seeking interim or final
compensation for services, or reimbursement of nettnary expenses, from the estate shall
file with the court an application setting forth a detailed statement of (1) the services rendered, time expended and expenses incurred, and (2) the amounts requested. An application for compensation shall include a statement as to what payments have theretofore been
made or promised to the applicant for services rendered or to be rendered in any capacity
whatsoever in connection with the case, the source of the compensation so paid or promised, whether any compensation previously received has been shared and whether an agreement or understanding exists between the applicant and any other entity for the sharing of
compensation received or to be received for services rendered in or in connection with the
case, and the particulars of any sharing of compensation or agreement or understanding
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torneys. 140 Therefore, some collection expenses that would be allowed
under state contract law would not be allowed in bankruptcy.
Among the things that have been proclaimed reasonable are expected
items such as attorneys' fees incurred before bankruptcy and appraisal
fees, 141 but some surprising, less expected, items have also been allowed.
One court at least hinted that interest on collection expenses would be
awarded if the contract so provided (although the contract in that case did
not so provide). 141 Also, attorneys' fees for representation outside the
bankruptcy case 141 as well as in the bankruptcy case have been allowed,
even if the attorneys' actions were detrimental to the estate. 144 Thus, the
estate must subsidize whatever boutique state-of-the-art services the secured party would like, provided only that the services are "reasonable."
At least one court, however, has worried about the adverse incentives
upon creditors 141 and has suggested that the actions must be those which
similarly situated creditors would take where "the creditor reasonably believed that the services employed were necessary to protect his interests in
therefore, except that details of any agreement by the applicant for the sharing of compensation as a member or regular associate of a firm of lawyers or accountants shall not be
required.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 2016(a).
140 In re Danise, 112 Bankr. 492, 495 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1990).
'" Dalessio v. Pauchon (In re Dalessio), 74 Bankr. 721, 724 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987); In re
Lederman Enters., Inc., 106 Bankr. 674, 678 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989).
141 In re Christian, 35 Bankr. 229, 232 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983).
141 In re Stoecker, 114 Bankr. 980, 986 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990) (discovery expenses in nonbankruptcy challenge to secured party's priority).
"' In re Nicfur-Cruz Realty Corp., 50 Bankr. 162, 167-68 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985); In re
Carey, 8 Bankr. 1000, 1004 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1981). But see In re Wiltwyck School, 34 Bankr. 270,
275-76 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (where the contract provided for expenses relating to "the lien of the
mortgage," expenses incurred in resisting the trustee's motion for § 506(c) did not qualify under the
agreement); In re Diaz Figueroa, 102 Bankr. 293, 295 (Bankr. D.P.R. 1989). The Diaz Figueroa
court stated:
Under the terms of the contract, [the secured party's assignee] is not entitled to the attorneys' fees requested because it did not refer the case to its attorney for the purposes of
collecting the loan by judicial means or instituting an action for repossession of the automobile. Rather, it was referred ... to defend against the trustee's [claim] that the notice of the
assignment had been filed too late.
In re Diaz Figueroa, 102 Bankr. at 295; see First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Silberman (In re
Silberman), 5 Bankr. 686 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1980) (litigation costs to lift stay to be borne by secured
party).
141 "A court should not reward a creditor whose overly aggressive attorney harasses and opposes
the debtor at every stage of the bankruptcy proceeding, nor should an oversecured creditor be given a
blank check to incur fees and costs which will automatically be reimbursed out of its collateral."
Dalessio v. Pauchon (In re Dalessio), 74 Bankr. 721, 723 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987).
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the debtor's property." 14•
One court has allowed attorneys' fees for pursuing a guarantor, who
would step into the shoes of the secured party and be subrogated in the
debtor's bankruptcy.m This seems questionable. Section 506(b) should be
understood to contemplate fees, costs, and charges relating to the enforcement of the secured claim against the debtor's estate, not a claim against
someone other than the debtor.
Attorneys' fees might be denied if the self-interested motion is unsuccessful.141 Similarly, fees incurred to help general creditors by drafting a
Chapter 11 plan 141 or fees generated by cooperating in a criminal proceeding against the debtor are also not allowed. 111° Furthermore, some
courts are simply hostile to the idea that the estate should pay for selfserving motions of the secured party. 1111
Attorneys' fees need not be paid in cash. Instead, the amount may be
added to the secured claim and paid later. 1111 One court even holds that for
the purposes of "curing" defaults in order to decelerate a loan under Section 1124(2), it is sufficient to add such expenses to the secured claim
instead of paying those amounts in cash. 1118

u•

Id. at 723; In re Wonder Corp., 72 Bankr. 580, 591 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1987) (creditors arc
entitled to recovery of fees and costs for "aggressive representation" but not "excessive caution or
overzealous advocacy"), ajfd, 82 Bankr. 186 (D. Conn. 1988). In addition, fees for novel appeals that
might help the secured party in future business, but which arc not reasonable in light of the size of
the secured party's claim in the bankruptcy at hand, arc not recoverable. In re Josephs, 108 Bankr.
654, 657 (Bankr. N.D. lll. 1989).
,., In re Lederman Enters., Inc., 106 Bankr. 674, 678 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989).
"" In re Kroh Bros. Dev. Co., 105 Bankr. 515, 528 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989); see In re Wonder
Corp., 72 Bankr. at 591 (disallowing fees for frivolous appeals and for appeals from unsuccessful
attempts to establish secured party entitlements under § 506(b)). In In re Swackhammer, 115 Bankr.
509 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990), Judge Bentz disallowed fees incurred as the result of a motion to lift the
automatic stay where the creditor was highly pessimistic about the value of the collateral. Id. at 510.
Judge Bentz stated: "We will not decide whether such a gross disparity may indicate that [the secured
creditor] made its allegations with a reckless disregard for the truth, in a single minded effort to
recover its collateral without regard to the rights of the other parties in the proceeding." Id. Indeed,
why decide when innuendo is perfectly adequate to make the· point?
"" In re Lederman Enters., Inc., 106 Bankr. at 678.
110 In re Stoecker, 114 Bankr. 980, 987 (Bankr. N.D. lll. 1990).
m See, e.g., Midland Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Masnorth Corp. (In re Masnonh Corp.), 36 Bankr.
335 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1984) (reducing a fee for overzealous representation).
m Florida Partners Corp. v. Southeast Co. (In re Southeast Co.), 868 F.2d 335, 340 (9th Cir.
1989); In re Colvin, 57 Bankr. 299, 302 (Bankr. D. Utah 1986). Indeed, if such expenses arc paid
out in cash, the equity cushion is preserved for new expenses and postpctition interest, implying that
the equity cushion is the condition for but not the limit of § 506(b) entitlements. See supra note 53
and accompanying text.
111 In re Southeast Co., 868 F.2d at 339-40. There is some legislative history. The Senate report
on the Bankruptcy Reform Act indicates that no "redemption premium" is required to cure defaults
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B. Prepayment Premiums
Prepayment premiums and lump sum default penalties are common
loan agreement provisions. Although both clearly fall within the concept
of "charge" as used in Section 506(b),m the two are arguably distinguishable in one respect. According to some authorities, a prepayment premium-payable only at the option of the debtor and never at the option of
the creditor-is the price a debtor has agreed to pay for such an option,
and as such, it is not a penalty for breach of contract in the nature of a
liquidated damage clause. 111 Nevertheless, pursuant to the express command of Section 506(b), the charges must be reasonable, and thus they
will still be reviewed. 1 " On the other hand, one court has ruled that any
prepayment of a loan is a breach, even if it is allowed by the contract in
exchange for paying a premium. 117 Therefore, if the prepayment is a
breach, the law of liquidated damages will be applied. 118 This is perhaps
a matter of state law,1" but in any case it is subject also to a potentially
stricter federal requirement of reasonableness. 110 Many courts, however,
do not indicate whether they are following a state or a federal rule. m
in the course of disimpairmcnt under§ 1124. S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 120, reprinted
in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5906. Judge Bufford, however, declares that this
brief remark is irrelevant to the meaning of § 506(b). In re Skyler Ridge, 80 Bankr. 500, 508-09
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987).
, .. In re A.J. Lane & Co., 113 Bankr. 821 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990).
111 See, e.g., William v. Fassler, 110 Cal. App. 3d 7, 11, 167 Cal. Rptr. 545, 547 (1980); set
Note, Prepayment Penalties: A Suroey and Suggestions, 40 VAND. L. REV. 409, 422-24 (1987).
These premiums do not seem to be "interest" for the purposes of the usury laws. Id. at 420-21.
lN Imperial Coronado Partners, Ltd. v. Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n (In re Imperial
Coronado Partners, Ltd.), 96 Bankr. 997, 1001 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989) (limiting secured party to
actual damages as measured by the difference between the market and contact rates of interest).
,.. In rt A.J. Lane & Co., 113 Bankr. at 827.
111 For a discussion of the validity of a liquidated damages clause, sec infra note 200 and accompanying text.
'" In re Kroh Bros. Dev. Co., 88 Bankr. 997, 999 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988). For a case in
which late charges were interpreted to be "interest on arrears" and, hence, illegal under relevant state
law, sec In re Jordan, 91 Bankr. 673 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988). One case ·held that state law was
preempted by regulations promulgated by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, not by bankruptcy
law. E.g., In re Imperial Coronado Partners, Ltd., 96 Bankr. at 999. For our purposes, this opinion
supports the idea that at least a nonbanliruptcy standard is relevant.
" 0 As stated in the previous section, see supra notes 126-140 and accompanying text, some
courts take the position that state law is irrelevant; federal law might enforce an agreement that state
law would condemn. Stt In re A.J. Lane & Co., 113 Bankr. at 823-25.
"' For examples of'nonspccificity involving default penalties, sec Mack Fin. Corp. v. Ireson, 789
F.2d 1083 (4th Cir. 1986) (5% of late installment payment as penalty held reasonable because it was
allowed under Virginia law); In re LHD Realty Corp., 726 F .2d 327, 332-33 (7th Cir. 1984) (4% of
late installment payment as penalty held reasonable); Dalessio v. Pauchon (/n re Dalessio), 74 Bankr.
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Loan contracts sometimes provide that the prepayment premium is
due only if the debtor elects to prepay, not if the creditor elects to accelerate upon default. 191 This raises the issue. whether a voluntary petition in
bankruptcy is a voluntary acceleration of the loan. If it is a voluntary
acceleration, the prepayment premium is automatically triggered as soon
as the debtor voluntarily files for bankruptcy.
Some cases, not dealing with prepayment premiums, indicate that a
bankruptcy petition, even if voluntarily filed by the debtor, is not to be
considered a voluntary act of the debtor. 111 While these cases do not involve prepayment premiums, their import would be that a debtor does not
owe the premium only by virtue of filing for bankruptcy. In United States
v. Technical Knockout Graphics, Inc. (In re Technical Knockout Graphics, Inc.), 194 Judge Leavy made a creative point: because bankruptcy
amounts to a transfer of assets to a trustee who is not the debtor, if the
trustee is deemed to prepay or accelerate a loan, then it is not the debtor's
voluntary choice, but someone else's, even where the debtor initiated the
proceeding by filing a voluntary bankruptcy proceeding. 1811 Judge Leavy,
721, 724 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987) (10% late charge proclaimed reasonable without further explanation); Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaumberg Hotel Owner, L.P., 97 Bankr. 943, 954 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1989) (10% of entire accelerated balance as a prepayment fee declared reasonable, and the
secured party received actual expenses as well); In re Planvest Equity Income Partners IV, 94 Bankr.
644, 645 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1988) (lump sum penalty declared unreasonable); Neusteter Realty Co. v.
Holzman-Demuth Noteholders (In rt Neusteter Realty Co.), 79 Bankr. 30, 33-34 (D. Colo. 1987)
(4% of overdue installment as penalty declared reasonable without any discussion of the theory of
reasonableness); Fleet Fin., Inc. v. Lejeune (In re Lejeune), 73 Bankr. 98, 99 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1987) (10% of late charge per installment held reasonable).
101 See In re LHD Realty Corp., 726 F.2d 327, 330-31 (7th Cir. 1984) (reasoning that "acceleration, by definition, advances the maturity date of the debt so that payment thereafter is not prepayment but instead is payment made after maturity"); In re Planvest Equity Income Partners IV, 94
Bankr. 644 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1988). For a case in which the penalty was due under the contract, even
if the prepayment were involuntary, see In rt 433 South Beverly Drive, 117 Bankr. 563, 569 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1990).
111 See, e.g. , United States v. Technical Knockout Graphics, Inc. (In re Technical Knockout
Graphics, Inc.), 833 F.2d 797, 803 (9th Cir. 1987) (payments to IRS not "voluntary" such that the
debtor could steer payments to trust fund liabilities for which officers were liable); In rt Cole, 93
Bankr. 707, 709-10 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989) (in California, Chapter 11 is a "forced sale" for purposes
of exemption law.).
,.. 833 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1987).
101 Id. at 802-03. Technical Knoc/iou.t dealt with the issue whether a debtor-in-possession in
Chapter 11 is free to allocate tax payments to "trust fund" tax liabilities (for which the officers are
personally liable) before ordinary taxes (for which they are not). Id. at 798. Judge Leavy held that
the debtor was not the trustee and therefore the payments by the debtor-in-possession were not voluntary. Id. at 802-03. Accordingly, the debtor-in-possession did not have the payor's privilege of
designating a payment to one of two debts owed to the same creditor. Id. at 803.
The Supreme Court has now ruled that a bankruptcy court may choose to order the allocation of
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however, overlooked the fact that the petition itself accelerates the loan,
which is usually the voluntary decision of the debtor. In Chapter 11, it is
just as possible to decelerate the loan, use and where the Chapter 11 trustee
does not do so, one court held that this passive failure to decelerate constituted a deliberate choice to prepay the loan. 187 Hence, the prepayment
penalty was applicable.
A similar point along the same line might also help defeat the equation of a voluntary bankruptcy petition with a choice to prepay. As has
already been emphasized,188 a bankruptcy trustee is a hypothetical lien
creditor. 188 If bankruptcy causes a transfer from the debtor to the trustee
as if by judicial lien, then it could be said that bankruptcy is involuntary
because judicial liens are involuntary transfers. This hypothetical characterization would help defeat the idea that a voluntary bankruptcy petition
amounts to the voluntary prepayment by the debtor.
In re LHD Realty Corp. 170 is consistent with the view that bankruptcy petitions do not constitute the debtor's choice to prepay. 171 In that
case, the secured party sought both to have the automatic stay lifted and to
preserve its right to a prepayment premium. 172 The Seventh Circuit held
that this affirmative motion constituted creditor acceleration, and hence,
the prepayment premium was not due and owing. 173 This decision implies
payments to cover trust fund tax liability first. United States v. Energy Resources Co., 110 S. Ct.
2139, 2140 (1990). Perhaps this opinion docs not contradict Technical Knockout for the exact point
stated. Technical Knockout, 833 F.2d 797. While Technical Knockout characterized the tax payment
as not voluntary, Energy Resources held only that a bankruptcy court can order such a payment to
extinguish a trust fund debt, for which corporate officers are liable, over ordinary taxes, for which
they are not liable. This power to allocate payments might exist regardless of whether those payments
are desigriated voluntary or involuntary. Energy Resources should not stand for the proposition that
the debtor-in-possession, as fiduciary, is free to cater to the self-interest of its officers (though admittedly that is certainly its effect).
, .. II U.S.C. § 1124 (1988).
117 E.g. Imperial Coronado Partners, Ltd. v. Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n (In re Imperial
Coronado Partners, Ltd.), 96 Bankr. 997, 1000 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989). In a slight variation, Judge
Yacos argued that even if the trustee's choice is the debtor's choice, in Chapter 7 no choice exists
because payment must be on an accelerated basis. In re Public Serv. Co., 114 Bankr. 813, 817-19
(Bankr. D.N.H . 1990). This lack of choice compels the view that the contractual prepayment penalty
is not due and owing because the trustee has not "elected" to prepay. This view, of course, overlooks
the fact that if the debtor has filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition in Chapter 7, the debtor has
voluntarily put the trustee in this predicament.
, .. See supra notes 163-167 and accompanying text.
11• II U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (1988).
" 0 726 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1984).
171 Id. at 330-33.
171 Id. at 329-30.
171 Id. at 331.
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that the bankruptcy petition did not represent the debtor's choice to prepay the loan.
LHD Realty implies an interesting and painful incentive for secured
creditors. 17' Under some views of adequate protection, a secured party is
not entitled to adequate protection of her collateral until she makes a motion to lift the stay. 171 If this is the rule, 17• the secured party is put to the
choice between forfciting her right to a prepayment interest penalty or
forfeiting adequate protection of the collateral. If she moves for relief from
the stay, she gains adequate protection but loses the prepayment premium.
Conversely, if she refrains from such a motion, she keeps the premium but
loses any right to adequate protection.
Along the same lines as In re LHD Realty177 is In re Public Service
Co. of New Hampshire, 178 which implied that even though the petition is
not an election to prepay, a presentation of a Chapter 11 plan in which
the secured claim is in fact prepaid is an election to prepay. 179 In this
case, however, the Chapter 11 plan had been formed by the creditors, not
the debtor, although the debtor had consented to it. 180 Therefore, the .court
concluded that the debtor had not elected to prepay and did not owe the
prepayment premium. 181
One court, however, has ruled that a voluntary bankruptcy petition is
tantamount to an election to prepay. 181 This characterization is consistent
"' St e generally Fisher, Malet-Whole Prepayment Premiums Under Attack, 45 Bus. LAW. 15,
29 (1989) [hereinafter Fisher].
m Su, e.g., In re Kain , 86 Bankr. 506, 512 (Bankr. W .D. Mich. 1988) ("Colloquially ex•
pressed, if you don't ask for it, you won't get it."). This view is based on Bankruptcy Code § 363(e),
which provides:
at any time, on request of an entity that has an interest in property used, sold, or leased
. . . by the trustee, the court, with or without a hearing, shall prohibit or condition such
use, sale, or lease as is necessary to provide adequate protection of such ·interest.
11 U.S.C § 363(e) (1988) (emphasis added).
171 See, e.g., Lincoln Nat'! Life Ins. Co. v. Craddock-Terry Shoe Corp. (In re Craddock-Terry
Shoe Corp.), 98 Bankr. 250, 255 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1988) (disputing such an interpretation of adequate protection).
'" As previously discussed, the court held that the petition is not an election to prepay but that a
subsequent event might constitute a creditor's option to declare default. Set supra notes 170-17 6 and
accompanying text.
"' 114 Bankr. 813 (Bankr. D.N.H . 1990).
"' Id. at 818-19.
'"Id. at 816.
111 Id . at 818-19.
111 In re Skyler Ridge, 80 Bankr. 500, 507 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987). The court went on, however, to find the prepayment penalty to be void as unreasonable. Id.; set Imperial Coronado Partners,
Ltd. v. Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n (In rt Imperial Coronado Partners, Ltd.), 96 Bankr. 997, 1000
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989) (although the creditor accelerated the payments, the debtor had the right to
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with some famous, though strange, state law. In Sharon Steel Corp. v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 188 a debtor was in the process of a private,
voluntary liquidation of its assets. 184 After a series of sales, it sold the
remaining assets (thirty-four percent of the original assets of the company) to Sharon Steel. 1811 According to, numerous indenture agreements to
which the debtor was a party, the debtor had the right to sell "all assets"
to a buyer who would assume the debts, without throwing the debentures
into default. 188 As a buyer of "all assets" who had assumed the debt,
Sharon Steel took the position that it was entitled to avoid default. 187
The indenture trustees disagreed. 188 They thought that "a:ll assets"
had to be measured before the piecemeal liquidation had commenced. 189
Accordingly, Sharon Steel was the buyer of substantially less than "all
assets." The indenture trustees then demanded that debtor cure "the default ... within 90 days or that the debentures be redeemed. " 190 Sharon
in turn sought a court declaration that there was no default and that, at
any rate, it owed no prepayment premium. 191
Judge Winter, for the Second Circuit, ruled that Sharon Steel did not
qualify as a buyer of all of the assets, and therefore, the debentures were
in default. 191 Nevertheless, the sale to Sharon Steel (a liquidation arguably analogous to a voluntary bankruptcy petition) was deemed to be tantamount to the choice to prepay. 198 Hence, the premium was due. According
to this view, any conscious choice by the debtor to default is a debtor's
choice to prepay, or, in the words of a commentator: "In effect, the holders requested-and got-specific performance of the redemption
reinstate, and having failed to do so, the acceleration became the debtor's choice); cf United States v.
Energy Resources, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2139 (1990) (debtor-in-possession had the power to designate
payments to the trust fund tax liability rather than another tax owed to the IRS).
,.. 691 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1012 (1983). It is far from clear what
state law Judge Winter believed he was construing. He was interpreting generic indenture language
from numerous debt issues, and so his opinion passes as the state law of at least Michigan, Mississippi, and probably a great many other jurisdictions as well. Id . at 1048-49.
'"' Id. at 1045.
'" Id. at 1046.
'"Id. at 1046 n.11.
111 Id. at 1946-47.
'" Id. at 1047.
'" Id. at 1049.
100 Id. at 1047.
m Id.
111 Id. at 1051-52. This part of the case is lucidly discussed in Bratton, The Interpretation of
Contracts Governing Corporate Debt Relationships, 5 CARDOZO L. REV. 371, 387-88 (1984) [hereinafter Bratton].
,.. Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 691 F.2d 1039, 1053 (2d Cir. 1982).
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provision. "1H
If private liquidation is analogized to a voluntary bankruptcy petition, this glimpse of state law heavily suggests that the bankruptcy petition itself is the debtor's voluntary choice to prepay the loan. Accordingly,
the prepayment penalty is due whenever a voluntary petition in bankruptcy is filed. Of course, if these latter views prevail, the prepayment
premium becomes a fully secured claim payable under Section 506(b). 1911
Hence, such reasoning is very expensive for the general creditors.

C.

Default Penalties

Separate from prepayment premiums, which are chosen by the
debtor, are higher postdefault penalties and interest rates, which are imposed by the creditors. Lump sum penalties are routinely scrutinized
under the state law of liquidated damages. 198 In a leading case on this
subject, Ferrari v. Barclays American/ Business Credit, Inc. (In re Morse
Tool, Inc.),1'7 the secured party claimed a large "termination fee" as a
collection expense under Section 506(b). 111 Judge Kenner treated this fee
as a "liquidated damage" clause and looked to Connecticut law to determine whether such a clause was enforceable. 199 In Connecticut, liquidated
damage clauses are upheld if "(1) at time the contract was made, damages
expected ... were uncertain in amount or difficult to prove; (2) the parties intended to liquidate damages in advance; and (3) the amount stipulated was 'reasonable.' " 180 If the termination fee provision could not meet
this requirement, it was dead. Judge Kenner, however, went on to note
that Section 506(b) limits secured party recoveries to "reasonable" fees,
costs, or charges. 101 Courts have taken this to mean actual expenses. 102
1M Bratton, supra note 192, at 398.
"' See supra note 192.
tN See In re Kroh Bros. Dev. Co., 88 Bankr. 997 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988).
'" 87 Bankr. 745 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988).
•N Id. at 749-50.
'" Id. at 750.
100 Id.
101 Id.
"' See, e.g., In re Kroh Bros. Dev. Co., 88 Bankr. 997, 1001 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988) (applying a liquidation damages standard to a prepayment premium); In re Lane Poultry, 63 Bankr. 745,
749 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1986); see also In re Baker, 49 Bankr. 240, 242-43 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985)
(a contract clause setting attorneys' fees as a percentage of the principal indebtedness, although valid
under state law, will be allowed under § 506(b) only to the extent that there is evidence of the need
for, and value of, the services provided).
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Judge Kenner reasoned:
[A]lthough a liquidated damages charge may be reasonable and valid under
Connecticut law because it was a reasonable estimate of the damages anticipated when the contract was made, that same charge will be valid and enforceable under § 506(b) only to the extent that the secured party actually
incurred damages. 1 °'

In the end, by limiting recovery to actual expenses incurred, the
court radically transformed the nature of this termination fee. If the secured party was entitled to those expenses under the contract, then the
termination fee clause added nothing to the secured party's rights. But if
the secured party had no right to collection expenses, then the termination
fee set the upward limit on how much collection expense the secured party
could collect from the collateral. 104
One interesting construction of a loan agreement went as follows: the
contract called for a four percent lump sum payment for any installment
payment that is late, but because the secured party accelerated the loan, it
rendered the ability of the debtor to pay installments impossible. 101
Hence, the penalty was excused. 1 " This was so even though a stipulation
between the secured party and the trustee reinstated the right to pay in••• In re Morse Tool, Inc., 87 Bankr. at 750.
Id.; see In rt LHD Realty Corp., 20 Bankr. 722, 725 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1982) (court deemed
4% surcharge on late payment that was actually made to be reimbursement for actual expenses, but
found that 4% charge on payments that were never made to be void as a penalty), affd, 726 F .2d 327
(7th Cir. 1984).
As a variation on this theme, some courts have held that even though only actual damages can be
recovered (in spite of the prepayment penalty clause), "actual damages" include the difference between the higher market rate and the lower contract rate. See, e.g., Imperial Coronado Partners, Ltd.
v. Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n (In rt Imperial Coronado Partners, Ltd.), 96 Bankr. 997, 1001
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989). An issue has arisen with regard to calculation of those damages. In two cases,
the contract provided that damages would be total interest dollars due under the contract rate minus
total dollars that would be obtained if principal were invested in risk-free, short-term treasury notes,
and this amount was not to be discounted to present value. In re Kroh Bros. Dev. Co., 88 Bankr. 997,
998-1002 (Bankr. W .D. Mo. 1988); In rt Skyler Ridge, 80 Bankr. 500, 503 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987)
(applying liquidated damage standards to a prepayment premium because parties stipulated to that
standard, in spite of uncertainty as to whether it was appropriate). Both courts struck down the
prepayment clause as unreasonable: first, the "risky" contract rate should have been compared to
some rate of comparable risk; and second, there should have been a ·discount to present value. In re
Kroh Bros Dev. Co., 88 Bankr. at 998-1002; In rt Skyler Ridge, 80 Bankr. at 503. For the view that
the Kroh court was guilty of "fine tuning," see Fisher, supra note 174, at 22-23.
100 In re Tavern Motor Inn, Inc., 69 Bankr. 138, 141-42 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1986).
100 Id. at 141.
104
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stallments. 107 Judge Conrad reasoned that the stipulation did not also reinstate the penalty, and there was no justification for importing a penalty
from one agreement into another separate agreement. 108

D.

High Postdejault Interest Rates

Loan agreements commonly provide that after default, interest rates
are to be higher. These high postdefault interest rates are often allowed
under state law. 10•
As stated earlier, the meaning of Ron Pair is that the contract does
not govern the oversecured party's entitlement to postpetition interest. 110
Accordingly, just because the contract requires an increased interest rate
after default does not mean that a bankruptcy court must honor this contract in bankruptcy. 111 On· the other hand, the contract does govern "fees,
costs, and charges." Therefore, if the extra interest can be called a "fee,
cost, or charge" to compensate for default, the contract might yet still govern. These clauses, however, are not characterized this way. Usually, they
are defended as compensation for extra risk of an insolvent debtor. 111 Yet
this is precisely the traditional role for a basic interest rate as well. Hence,
it is not clear that higher postdefault interest rates can survive Ron Pair.
In addition, some courts have ruled that higher postdefault interest
rates are not subject to a "reasonableness" requirement. 118 Instead, "[a]
court should allow contractually bargained for default interest rates under
Section 506(b) without examining the reasonableness of these rates provided they fall within the range of acceptable rates." 114 Such a view
clearly associates higher default rates with interest, rather than contrac101 Id. at 140-41.
... Id. at 141-42.
- See The Bank of Last Resort, supra note 138, at 264-65. But see Garrett v. Coast & Southern Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 9 Cal. 3d 731, 108 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1973).
11 • Set supra notes 14-23 and accompanying text.
111 See In re 433 South Beverly Drive, 117 Bankr. 563, 565-67 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990). In
Beverly Drive, Judge Lax noted that higher default interest rates could be avoided generally because
they could be avoided under the "cure" provisions of disimpairment. See 11 U.S.C. § 1124(2) (1988).
Cure and disimpairmcnt arc discussed supra in the text accompanying notes 67-86.
111 See, e.g., Ruskin v. Griffiths, 269 F.2d 827, 832 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied , 361 U.S. 947
(1960).
111 See, e.g., Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaumberg Hotel Owner, L.P. (In re
Schaumberg Hotel Owner, L.P.), 97 Bankr. 943, 951 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989); set In re Skyler Ridge,
80 Bankr. 500, 511 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987) ("Any restriction on the contract rate of interest must
thus come from state law, and not from bankruptcy law.").
11 • In re Schaumberg Hotel Owner, 97 Bankr. at 951.

1990]

Postpetition Interest

421

tual "fees, costs, and charges." In turn, Ron Pair disenfranchises the contract together with the concept of higher postdefault interest rates. 1111
Some courts do purport to review higher postdefault interest rates for
reasonableness. 116 Other authorities specify that higher postdefault interest rates have to pass muster under the liquidated damage clause tests, just
the same as flat payment penalties are tested. 117 These opinions are more
consistent with the idea that higher postdefault interest rates are in the
nature of a "fee, cost, or charge" within the meaning of Section· 506(b). As
such, the contract does govern, and the contract rate, therefore, might be
applied.
Even if the contract is made relevant by this move, it must, of course,
be reasonable under a federal and perhaps a state standard. A few prePair courts refused to allow the increase in interest rate after default (unless the debtor is solvent), noting that, after default, there is little risk of
nonpayment given that the debtor is under the supervision of a bankruptcy court. 118 One court read a loan agreement to mean that the higher
111 Pre-Pair courts sometimes reasoned that the higher postdefault rate results in a lower
predefault rate, and, therefore, should be upheld. See, e.g., Ruskin, 269 F.2d at 832; In re Berry
Estates, Inc., 34 Bankr. 612, 615-16 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); see also Baylor, After Bankruptcy Lets
the Curtain Fall: Are Claims in Reorganization Proceedings for Post-Petition Interest at Higher
"Default Rates" Consigned to Universal Darkness7, 86 COM. L.J. 221 {1981) (arguing for freedom
of contract). This argument, however, should also suffice for prepayment penalties-or any overreaching advantage for secured parties, such as torture or -kidnapping.
The Berry Estates court, nevertheless, improvised on the contract, which had called for a specified postdefault rate or the maximum rate allowed by law, whichever was higher. In re Berry Estates,
Inc., 34 Bankr. at 614-15. Subsequently, the New York legislature repealed the relevant usury limitations, meaning that the lender seemed entitled to infinite interest. Id. at 615. The court intervened
and awarded the lender what it took to be a market rate of interest. Id. at 616.
... See, e.g., Presque Isle Apts., L.P. v. Landmark Sav. Assocs. (In re Presque Isle Apts., L.P.),
112 Bankr. 744, 748 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990) (6% late charge approved because it was reasonable
and provided for in the contract); In re White, 88 Bankr. 498, 511 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988) (48% hike
deemed unreasonable); In re Rolfe, 25 Bankr. 89 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982) (interest on interest disallowed as penalty), affd, 710 F.2d 1 {1st Cir. 1983). See generally The Bank of Last Resort, _supra
note 138, at 276.
In Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156 (1946), a debenture provided
for interest on unpaid interest. Id. at 157-58. This contract was valid under state law, but it was
struck down for being unreasonable or for being a penalty. Id. at 164. The Vanston opinion continues
to be much cited today.
Although Vanston deals with interest on interest, Judge Waterman thought Vanston might also
apply to higher default rates as well, but that Vanston should not apply when the debtor is solvent.
Ruskin v. Griffiths, 269 F.2d 827, 830-32 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 947 (1960).
111 Set, e.g., In re Tastyeast, Inc., 126 F.2d 879, 881-82 (3d Cir.) (default interest void as a
penalty under liquidated damage standard), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 696 (1942); In re Rolfe, 25 Bankr.
89, 94 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982) (interest on interest void as a penalty).
111 See, e.g., In re W.S. Sheppley & Co., 62 Bankr. 271, 278-79 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986).
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rate became applicable only if the secured party declared a default. 119 The
secured party had not declared a default before bankruptcy, and to do so
after bankruptcy would have violated the automatic stay. Also, the fact
that bankruptcy itself was an event of default was declared to be unenforceable, and therefore, the effectiveness of the higher interest rate was
blocked. 110 These opinions might still cancel the contract even if Ron Pair
docs not.
Even if the postdefault interest rate is valid, the rate can be avoided if
the debtor-in-possession decides to deceierate111 the loan under Bankruptcy Code Section 1124(2).111 According to Section 1124(2), "notwithstanding any contractual provision ... that entitles the [creditor] to demand or receive accelerated payment . . . after the occurrence of a
default," the debtor-in-possession can reinstate the maturity of the loan if
all past defaults are cured and damages paid. 118 This provision is similar
to the "executory contracts" provision of the Bankruptcy Code, which
permits the debtor-in-possession or trustee to capture the value that such
prospective obligations might hold. 114
One creditor entitled to a higher postdefault interest rate tried to save
this privilege by arguing that Section 1124(2) applies only to accelerated
loans-that is, loans the secured party chose to accelerate. 1111 Since it had
a fully mature claim, which it had not accelerated, the creditor argued
that it should be able to insist on full payment of the higher postdefault
interest rate. 118 The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument. 117 Even here,
deceleration under Section 1124(2) allows the debtor-in-possession to escape the postdefault interest rate. That is, Section 1124(2) allows for the
allocation of the status quo as if no default occurred, which has the magical effect of lowering the interest rate to predefault levels. 118
.,. E.g., In rt Grant Broadcasting, Inc., 71 Bankr. 376, 386 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.), aff d, 75 Bankr.
819, 823 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
11• Id. at 386.
111 For a discussion of deceleration, see supra notes 67-86 and accompanying text.
111 Set Florida Partners Corp. v. Southeast Co. (In rt Southeast Co.), 868 F.2d 335 (9th Cir.
1989); In re Singer Island Hotel, Ltd., 95 Bankr. 845 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989) .
... 11 u.s.c. § 1124(2) (1988).
114 See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1988).
111 Great Western Bank & Trust v. Entz-White Lumber & Supply, Inc. (In re Entz-White
Lumber & Supply, Inc.), 850 F.2d 1338, 1342-44 (9th Cir. 1988). In this case, "cure" meant paying
the secured party in full.
'"Id .
•., Id.
111 For an opinion that invalidates high postdefault rates generally because cure and deceleration
arc hypothetically possible under Chapter 11, see In rt 433 South Beverly Drive, 117 Bankr. 563
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Interest on Interest

Suppose interest payments are in default. Can an oversecured party
obtain interest on interest under Section 506(b)?
Outside bankruptcy, some states flatly disallow it. 119 Others allow it
if it is in the contract. 1 " Yet, as earlier discussion has indicated, the Supreme Court in United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 181 has ruled
that the right of a secured party to postpetition interest is not necessarily
governed by the contract, or even state law. Rather, the contract governs
only "costs, fees, and charges."111 Therefore, ~hatever rights a secured
party has to interest on interest, she has them irrespective of the contract,
unless they can be characterized as a "cost, fee, or charge."
If Ron Pair stands against the use of the contract for determining
whether interest on interest should be allowed, the still-respected decision
in Vanston Bondholders Protective Committee v. Green111 disallows it as
a matter of federal equity. In that reorganization case, the contract called
for interest on interest in case payments were late. 1 " New York law disallowed interest on interest, but the Supreme Court ruled that, as a matter
of federal law, the contract provision was void as a penalty.111
This prejudice against interest on interest can be questioned for at
least three reasons. First, interest on interest can be viewed as purely compensatory. That is, a debtor ~as defaulted on an interest payment, and the
creditor is deprived of funds for a period of time. Interest is the traditional
remedy for depriving a creditor of funds. What difference does it make
that the amount due was itself an interest obligation ?118
Second, interest on interest may be required in order to cure past
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990).
1H See, e.g., Green v. Vanston Bondholders Protection Comm. (In re American Fuel & Power
Co.), 151 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1945) (New York law), affd, 329 U.S. 156 (1946); Shapiro v. Bailen,
293 Mass. 121 , 123, 199 N.E. 315, 317 (1936) (Massachusetts law).
·
Ho See, e.g., CAL. C1v. CODE§ 1916-2 (West 1985); Gincastro v. Fairlawn Credit Union (In re
Gincastro), 48 Bankr. 662 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1985) (disallowing interest on interest because not in the
contract).
m 109 S. Ct. 1026 (1989); see supra text accompanying notes 14-23.
... Recall that § 506(b) gives oversecured parties "interest on such claim, and any reasonable
fees, costs, or charges provided for under the agreement." The Supreme Court thought that the
comma after "claim" proved that the contract docs not govern the interest entitlement of oversccurcd
parties. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
... 329 U.S. 156 (1946); see supra note 24 and accompanying text.
... Id. at 157-58 .
... Id. at 164. Vanston was followed to disallow interest on interest under Section 506(b) in In
re Laymon, 117 Bankr. 563, 564 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990).
... See L. JONES, MORTGAGES § 650, at 1076 (5th ed. 1908).
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defaults and disimpair a secured party. 187 This rule reflects the compensatory nature of interest on interest. If interest on interest is required, or at
least allowed as part of a cure,918 why should it not be used routinely
under Section 506(b) whenever postpetition interest is accrued, instead of
paid out ?911
Third, as with the distinction between lump sum payments and
higher postdefault interest, 940 interest on interest does not seem distinguishable from the default penalties, which are allowed if they qualify
under state liquidated damage standards. Every such lump sum payment
is to some degree interest on interest. That is, if an installment payment
partly represents interest, a lump sum percentage penalty on a late installment could easily be characterized (and must be characterized) as compensatory payment to the lender for the lateness of the payment; this is
nothing but .interest on interest. Nevertheless, whereas lump sum penalties
arc accepted as a form of liquidated damages, interest on interest seems to
set off alarm bells.
The court in Shearson Lehman Mortgage Corp. v. Laguna (In re
Laguna)M 1 managed to dodge the implication of Ron Pair by pointing
.., 11 U.S.C. § 1124(2)(c) (1988) (disimpainncnt requires compensation "for any damages incurred as a result of any reasonable reliance . , . on such [breached] contractual provision"); see
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Manville Forest Prods. Corp. v. Manville Forest Prods.
Corp. (In rt Manville Forest Prods. Corp.), 60 Bankr. 403, 404-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (including interest on interest); In rt Arlington Village Partners Ltd., 66 Bankr. 308, 316-17 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1986) (awarding the market rate of interest on interest). For Chapter 13 cases, sec Cardinal Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass'n v. Colegrove (In re Colegrove), 771 F.2d 119, 122 (6th Cir. 1985); In re Marx, 11
Bankr. 819 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981). For a case denying that interest on interest is appropriate to
cure past defaults for the purpose of disimpainnent, sec In re Siegfried, 114 Bankr. 358 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. 1990) .
... Some courts will allow interest on interest as part of cure and disimpainnent only if the
original loan agreement expressly provides for it. See, e.g., In re Capps, 836 F.2d 773 (3d Cir. 1987)
(Chapter 13). Such courts arc worried that interest on interest without a contractual provision illegally "modifies" (albeit in her favor) the rights of a secured party claiming a residence as the sole
collateral. Section 1322(b)(2) forbids the modification in a plan of the rights of a secured ·creditor
holding the principal residence as collateral. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988).
111 One of the "cure" cases asserts that interest on interest as part of cure is mandated by §
506(b) itself, E.g., In re Marx, 11 Bankr. 819 (Bankr. S.D, Ohio 1981). This conclusion, however,
cannot be sustained. Even an undersecured creditor who is to be disimpaired has the right to a cure,
and this could independently entail the right to interest on interest. On the other hand, Judge Lax has
reasoned generally that whatever rule exists for disimpainncnt (in other words, no higher interest
rates) should be the rule for § 506(b). In re 433 South Beverly Hills Drive, 117 Bankr. 563, 565-67
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990), On this reasoning, interest on interest should be incorporated into§ 506(b)
jurisprudence .
... See supra notes 210-227 and accompanying text.
141 114 Bankr. 214 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990).
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out that California law specifically disallows interest on interest unless the
contract provides for it. 141 In other words; Section 506(b) presupposes that
state law requires interest payments, and if California requires a contract,
then Ron Pair is supposedly superseded-a contract there must be. 141
This argument, of course, presupposes that even if the contract (as
abstracted from state law) does not govern interest, state law (as abstracted from contract law) does. Yet Ron Pair can easily be read to mean
that federal law is to govern the rate of interest."' This is indeed what
the Vanston court explicitly said, and there is no evidence that this wellknown opinion was intended to be overruled by the drafters. 1411
V.

CONCLUSION

This article has tried to describe in a comprehensive way the rights
of an oversecured creditor under Bankruptcy Code Section 506(b). It has
tried to show the implications of a rule that makes the equity cushion the
limit of Section 506(b) entitlements to interest and collection expenses.
Specifically, this article has tried to reconcile the contradiction between
this idea and the idea of cash payments as a means of adequate protection.
In addition, this article has examined the implications of Ron Pair,
which holds that the contract does not govern the rate of interest, although
it does govern collection expenses, late charges, and the like. The chief
casualty in this analysis was higher default interest rates. Because the contract is disenfranchised from interest rates, postdefault rates can be justified only if they can be deemed "fees, costs, and charges," which Section
506(b) does subject to the contract. Finally, interest on interest has been
barred by a pre-Code Supreme Court, but in light of recent doctrine involving "disimpairment," where interest on interest is allowed, this policy
might now be reconsidered.

•
... Id. at 216.
... Id . at 217 .
.., As was done by Judge Clark in In re Laymon, 117 Bankr. 856 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990) .
.., Laguna also addressed a purely real estate concern. Under Chapter 13, the plan may not
"modify" the rights of a mortgagee claiming the debtor's principal residence as collateral. 11 U.S.C. §
1322(b)(2) (I 988). Laguna and other cases reason that giving interest on interest in the absence of a
contractual agreement constitutes an illegal modification (in the mortgagee's favor) . 113 Bankr. at
216-18; see In re Capps, 836 F.2d 773 (3d Cir. 1987) (no interest on interest as part of cure where
the contract docs not call for it); Foster Mortgage Co. v. Terry (In re Terry), 780 F.2d 894 (11th Cir.
1985).
.

